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ABSTRACT 
 From fighting occupying foreign forces to successfully combating ISIS (Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria) across two countries, Iraqi Shiite militias appear to be 
transforming into a formal military with a transnational reach. What are the implications 
of the continued formalization of these militias in Iraq, especially since their 
incorporation into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—an umbrella organization 
that serves as an official auxiliary to Iraq’s regular military but which has taken the lead 
in much of the fighting in the country’s war against ISIS since 2015? The presence of a 
foreign patron affects an armed group’s legitimacy, which we break down into three 
levels: popular legitimacy, legitimacy in domestic politics, and international legitimacy. 
Because some of the militias in the PMF are clients of Iran, this thesis argues that their 
close ties to Iran have had a broadly negative impact on their national standing and has 
limited their potential impact on the formation of the post-war Iraqi state. 
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I. IRREGULAR ARMED GROUPS WITH A PATRON AND 
STATE BUILDING 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Throughout history, large militaries and their ability to wage wars have significantly 
contributed to the formation of states and impacted their style of governance. However, the 
scope of this phenomenon seems to be limited to certain times and places in the world. More 
recently, irregular armed forces have come to play an equally important role in the formation 
of states in parts of the world. They have influenced the path on which some states have 
evolved leading to the development of different types of states. In some states where patronage 
networks have been fundamental to the role of irregular armed forces in state formation, those 
networks have had a negative impact on state development and progress. While domestic 
patrons have been the focus of past scholarship, this thesis will expand the aperture of the 
discussion to examine the role of foreign patrons on irregular armed groups and their impact 
on state-building. It will further examine how the legitimacy of the armed groups has been 
affected (positively and negatively) by their connections to foreign patronage. These issues 
will be explored through the case of the Iraqi Shiite militias, which have grown from a 
collection of disparate, mostly Iran-backed armed groups to become a formidable and official 
armed force under the form of the PMF in Iraq. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Academic Significance 
There has been a wide range of literature that discusses the role of militaries in 
state-building. Central to that literature is Charles Tilly’s comprehensive framework based 
on the history of northwestern Europe. Also such authors as Achilles Batalas have 
acknowledged the participation of armed groups in the process of state-building. However, 
no work to date has adequately explored the influence of armed groups with a foreign 
patron on the process of state-building. I will shed light on this aspect of the literature 
through the case of the Iraqi Shiite militias and their main patron the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Corps (IRGC) of Iran.  
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2. Regional Significance 
Shiite militias have emerged as very effective military forces in both Iraq and Syria. 
They have been able to amass a large number of volunteers in a very short time and to 
constitute a coherent military entity under the umbrella of the PMF. Although not all 
militias in the PMF are backed by Iran, the most important groups in the PMF are Iranian 
clients and have played a central role in the decision making process of the organization. 
After ISIS seized large territory in Iraq, the PMF succeeded where the U.S.-trained Iraqi 
army had failed, and they were able to reverse the expansion of ISIS and have been able to 
eradicate its territorial possessions in Iraq almost completely. Furthermore, the Iran-backed 
militias in the PMF have played a very important role in fighting ISIS in Syria. Through 
their involvement in both wars, they have accumulated enormous military experience, and 
have become extremely capable especially in terms of operational coordination with other 
military entities. The broader alliance of Iraq’s Shiite militias with their Iranian patrons, 
the Syrian military and paramilitary forces, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and other Iran-backed 
Shiite groups could be very beneficial for the PMF in the future.  
Moreover, the fact that the PMF was embraced by the Iraqi government and 
officially declared as a governmental organization gives it legal and political legitimacy on 
top of its popular and social legitimacy. The scene of having two distinct officially 
recognized military organizations in a country reminds us of the similar circumstances in 
neighboring Iran, wherein the IRGC was established after the 1979 revolution as a 
counterpart to Iran’s regular military, but has become far more politically important than 
its predecessor. A substantial part of the armed groups making up the PMF as well as most 
of their leadership enjoy direct support from the IRGC. This patronage is probably behind 
the growth and sustainment of the PMF as well as the ventures of some of its constituents 
into Syria. Nevertheless, there still exists a strong rivalry between three competing factions 
within the PMF. The PMF, though being able to coherently work against a common threat, 
is actually made of some 50 different groups.1 While one faction is holding the support and 
the agenda of the IRGC, another faction falls under the influence of the prominent Shiite 
                                                 
1 Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jaber, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future,” Middle 
East Center, April 1, 2017, 12. 
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religious leader al-Sistani and Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abadi, and a third is led by the 
Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Therefore, the future face of the PMF, and by extension, an 
increasingly important part of the contemporary Iraqi state, will be likely determined by 
the prevailing of one of these factions over the others. 
The majority of the PMF members and their senior leadership are Shi’a Muslim. 
With such a sectarian coloring, it is difficult to easily imagine the contribution of the PMF 
to a unified and stable Iraq. For example, could the effectiveness of this organization 
against Sunni insurgencies and Kurdish secessionists be regarded as a unifying factor? 
Alternatively, might their success be viewed through the lens of government (or even 
sectarian) suppression? Will the PMF be able to distinguish between the interests of Iraq 
and those of its patrons? Will it be able to act in a unified Iraq’s interests if those interests 
run counter to Iran’s? There is no doubt that should the faction supported by the IRGC 
prevail over the others, the IRGC would be able to help mold the PMF in its own image 
and help facilitate the export of Iran’s revolutionary politics to its neighbor. On the other 
hand, if one of the opposing factions to Iran were able to dominate the PMF, how would 
the Iran-backed groups respond, and to what extent, if any, would they submit to Iraqi 
governmental authority if it meant a dilution or dissolution of their domestic power and 
influence? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The formation of states is a question that still has historians debating it and the 
factors behind it while trying to separate the rules from the exceptions. Charles Tilly placed 
a major emphasis on centralized military forces and their tendencies to wage war as the 
rule behind the evolution of states in Northwestern Europe. On the other hand, many 
historians saw the formation of states in Northwestern Europe as the exception and not the 
rule as most developing countries recently took different paths. 
This literature review will examine the contribution of regular militaries and their 
evolution to the formation of states and their subsequent shapes as portrayed by Charles 
Tilly. It will then explore some of the more recent literature focusing on the role of irregular 
armed groups in state formation. This perspective has been adopted by many contemporary 
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historians, one of whom is Achilles Batalas on the case of Greece in the 19th century. 
Finally, this review will consider the special case of armed groups with domestic patrons 
and how this nuance renders a destructive influence on the formation and stability of states. 
William Reno dissects the social order of some of the West African countries and explains 
the patronage networks ravaging through their societies. 
1. The Role of the Military in State-Building 
Charles Tilly’s work on state formation in Europe is foundational to our 
understanding of the role of militaries in that process. His main argument claims that 
military power has been formulating the primary factor in the formation of the modern 
state. Building up military power amounts to war making, which he considers essential for 
state making. Central to his argument is that the state should maintain monopolistic control 
over the means of coercion within its territory in order to sustain itself and develop its 
structure.2 Therefore, all competition over the use of force must be either destroyed, 
neutralized, or absorbed to consolidate a monopoly on coercion.  
Tilly brings to the table that the play between coercion, capital and connection 
determines the outcome of the state’s capacity. Coercion would be the use of force or any 
means that causes damage to people or their possessions.3 Capital constitutes resources that 
are of value and can be transferred and benefited from.4 Connection encompasses the social 
ties among groups, people or any two social entities.5 The accumulation and concentration 
of these three elements in European societies highly influenced the shape and function of 
the states they formed. Tilly concludes in this regard that the lack of any of these three 
ingredients or the high concentration of one over the others does not favor the development 
of a capable state. However, he argues that when coercion, capital and connection are 
                                                 
2 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back in, 
eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 175. 
3 Charles Tilly, “Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650,” in Irregular Armed 
Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation, eds. Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 43. 
4 Ibid., 45 
5 Ibid. 
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present in moderate levels in a society, then the state develops its capacity in a more stable 
and sustainable manner.6 
On the other hand, Tilly draws on differences between coercion-intensive, capital-
intensive and capitalized-coercion state formation. Landlords with many dependent 
subjects pursued coercion intensive state formation, while city states with substantial 
resources turned to capital-intensive state formation.7 Eventually both would be outlived 
by rulers who were successful in combining immense applications of coercion and capital 
through capitalized-coercion state formation.8 
Moreover, because mainly I will be concerned with the role of sub-state armed 
group in state-building, I will focus more on the coercion aspect of the state formula. Tilly 
discusses in great detail the evolution of militaries and in the different forms that they were 
erected and the different means that they were used to provide the coercive force needed 
for the state. In earlier stages of European history, rulers summoned armies from groups 
and persons who owed them personal services.9 Later, they relied on contracted 
mercenaries to maintain the ability to remain superior in using force.10 Finally, the rulers 
began to form regular armies, in the modern sense, from the population that existed within 
the territories that they controlled.11 This shift in the forms of the executer of the coercive 
force to its latter structure and form is what ultimately gave the military the significant role 
in state formation. 
Consequently, war was the tool that the states used to manifest their grip on 
violence and as Tilly mentioned, “War made the state and the state made war.” War gives 
the state context to accumulate more coercion means and enables it to further perfect the 
                                                 
6Tilly, “Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650,” 49. 
7 Ibid., 53. 
8 Ibid. 




functions of its centralized institutions.12 Even if war were not imminent, the states would 
resort to fictitiously advertise external war in order to justify their steps in resource 
gathering and augmenting their coercive means.13 In a progressive state formation process, 
the military of the state would remove internal competition over the use of force. One way 
to achieve that was by making bearing arms by civilians illegal and impractical.14 In 
addition, external competition would be eliminated by waging wars. In addition, providing 
protection for its clients was what kept the state’s existence relevant. Therefore, in order to 
achieve those three roles by the military, the state was able to justify the acquisition of 
resources from its clients.15 
Despite the application of Charles Tilly’s theory on the formation of northwestern 
European states, many authors criticize it for its limitation in time and place. For example, 
Anthony W. Pereira asserts that the monopoly of the use of force by the state is sometimes 
not the final chapter of the formation of the state and could be reversed.16 Furthermore, the 
evolution that the military went through in northwestern Europe as described by Tilly did 
not happen everywhere else.17 Moreover, Pereira stresses that irregular armed forces in 
some developing countries were more significant than the state’s military or police.18 
Similarly, Miguel Angel Centeno recognizes the limitation of Tilly’s theory when he tries 
to apply it to states in Central America. He deduces that the constrained nature of the wars 
in that part of the world allowed for a different outcome of the states.19 In addition, Diane 
                                                 
12 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 – 1992, (Malden: Blackwell, 1992), 
75. 
13 Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 171. 
14 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 – 1992, 69. 
15 Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 181. 
16 Anthony W. Pereira, “Armed Forces, Coercive Monopolies, and Changing Patterns of State 
Formation and Violence,” in Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation, eds. 
Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 388. 
17 Ibid., 389. 
18 Ibid., 390. 
19 Miguel Angel Centeno, “Limited War and Limited States,” in Irregular Armed Forces and Their 
Role in Politics and State Formation, eds. Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 87. 
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E. Davis emphasizes that the role that irregular armed forces played in the formation of 
states during the era that Tilly inspects was undermined in the latter’s writings.20 
2. The Role of Irregular Armed Groups in State-Building 
Achilles Batalas has similarly challenged Tilly’s state formation framework by 
presenting a case where that framework was not applicable for various reasons. Batalas 
established that in some cases, what one would expect to occur given Tilly’s state model 
did not occur at all. He presented the state of Greece in the nineteenth century, and gave 
evidence of the state requiring protection from irregular armed groups rather than 
becoming the supplier of protection. Furthermore, he showed how these irregular armed 
groups actually played a much more important role than the regular military in exercising 
the state’s military aspiration as well as contributing to the formation of the state. The main 
question that Batalas addresses is the outcome from the state’s elites inability to establish 
a monopoly on the coercive force.21 
Therefore, when the state failed to eliminate irregular armed groups by force, it 
turned to bargaining with them and in some occasions employing them.22 The author shows 
that this was the case in 19th century Greece. However, he was careful not to declare that 
the way in which this relationship unfolded between the state elites and irregular forces in 
Greece to be a universal trend. Rather, he emphasizes that the “sociopolitical environment” 
and the “international context” would shape that relationship and determine its form as well 
as its sense of utilization.23 
In the case of Greece, during the Kapodistrian administration and the Bavarian 
regime, the state was unable to get rid of irregular armed groups and tended to incorporate 
                                                 
20 Diane E. Davis, “Contemporary Challenges and Historical Reflections on the Study of Militaries, 
States, and Politics,” in Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation, eds. Diane 
E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7. 
21 Achilles Batalas, “Send a Thief to Catch a Thief: State-Building and the Employment of Irregular 
Military Formations in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Greece,” in Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in 
Politics and State Formation, eds. Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (New York: Cambridge 




or employ them. The Kapodistrian administration integrated the irregular groups into semi-
regular forces with the intent to turn them into a regular military.24 Similarly, after the 
Bavarian regime failed to eliminate the irregular militaries, it employed large numbers of 
their groups in an attempt to change the men’s allegiance from their captains and be able 
to absorb them into a regular formation.25 
The ways in which the irregular groups were used by the state varied from 
providing protection to waging war. The state required their protection against the groups 
themselves and against other uncontracted groups.26 Also since the Great Powers (France, 
Great Britain, and Russia) did not favor that Greece pursue the unification with the Greeks 
who were within the Ottoman empire, the state elites directed the irregular groups to 
support irredentist rebellions within the Ottoman Empire.27 At some point, the Empire’s 
army was overwhelmed by the irregular forces from Greece that were viewed as a Greek 
invading force.28 Furthermore, the Kolettis administration regarded the irregular 
formations to be the principal military force in case a war erupted with the Ottoman 
Empire.29  
Even though irregular armed groups may engage in hostilities against the state and 
its institutions, Greece was able to take advantage of their proliferation in the nineteenth 
century. The state was able to form centralized and autonomous institutions although it 
lacked a monopoly over the means of coercion. It was successful in that it became the 
“most powerful patron in Greek society.”30 Therefore, the employment of irregular armed 
groups did not obstruct the state formation, but was actually part of it.31 
                                                 
24 Batalas, “Send a Thief to Catch a Thief,” 159. 
25 Ibid., 162. 
26 Ibid., 150. 
27 Ibid., 165. 
28 Ibid., 166. 
29 Ibid., 165. 
30 Batalas, “Send a Thief to Catch a Thief,” 169. 
31 Ibid. 
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Batalas concluded that the Greek state was forced to resort to the use of irregular 
armed forces for several reasons.32 First, it was unable to establish a monopoly on the 
means of power since it could not defeat the irregular forces. Second, the influence of the 
Great Powers and their objection over the intervention of Greece in the affairs of the Greek 
in the Ottoman Empire. Third, the state was unable to extract resources from its population. 
Fourth, the prevalence of an irregular military tradition within the Greek society. 
3. The Role of Armed Groups with Domestic Patron in State-Building 
William Reno has examined armed groups in West Africa and their political role 
and influence on state-building capabilities. He has linked their emergence to “violent 
patronage networks” and “collapsing states.”33 The leaders of these countries seemed to 
rely on informal armed groups to secure their position and power rather than on state 
institutions. Moreover, these leaders exploited the state resources and purposefully 
withered the state capabilities in favor of accumulating enough personal resources to 
sustain their patronage over the armed groups.34 In return, these armed groups with local 
patronage served no purpose in any state-building process, on the contrary, their existence 
was the very reason that states would collapse.  
Reno reinforced this claim by pointing out that infrastructure and basic services in 
countries of West Africa became depleted before wars even broke up in them.35 This was 
due to the actions of their patron in power and due to their coercive behavior over the 
citizens, the businesses and their patron’s rivals. Reno also revealed that the opposition to 
the man in power did not intend to remove him to bring any change to the system, but 
rather to replace him in order to provide for their own needs and nourish their own 
networks. Furthermore, in many cases the armed groups became so efficient in their 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 154. 
33 William Reno, “The Changing Nature of Warfare and the Absence of State-Building in West 
Africa,” in Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation, eds. Diane E. Davis 
and Anthony W. Pereira (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 323. 
34 Ibid., 326. 
35 Ibid. 
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coercion practices that their leaders would develop the ability and boldness to replace their 
patron, resulting in consecutive coups and armed struggles in those countries.36  
Therefore, Reno saw that these trends in West Africa of social and political 
dynamics defied the need of the ruler for a military with a monopoly on the coercive force 
as Tilly based the state-building strategy.37 On the contrary, these rulers tended to promote 
division among the different factions in their country, diluted the capabilities of state 
institutions to resolve disputes and kept their own proxies dominant on the field. This 
prohibited any other rivals from organizing or rising against them and at the same time 
everyone sought their help, which kept them in power.38 Consequently, Reno regarded that 
the ruler’s purposeful spread of disorder to maintain his power did not allow him to 
appease, coopt or remove his rivals — a step set by Tilly as essential to state-building.39  
Moreover, Reno asserted that the main fear of the rulers in West Africa was from 
internal threats rather than from external interventions or invasions. So they tended to 
divide and weaken their militaries, as those were the principal source of threat and the more 
likely to bread bold generals who would attempt coups. On the other hand, the rulers would 
establish patronage networks directly linked to them.40 These networks depended totally 
on the ruler for the sustainability and they would be the primary source of protection for 
the ruler. However, all political leaders took similar approaches at their private security 
and consequently the state’s coercive capability was split between private competing 
armies arising from the patronage networks. 
In addition, Reno in his article titled “Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed 
Groups” went deeper into the behavior of armed groups based on the presence or lack of a 
local patron. This behavior was closely linked to the relationship with the local population 
and the source of legitimacy of the group. He related the protective behavior of some armed 
                                                 
36 Reno, “The Changing Nature of Warfare and the Absence of State-Building in West Africa,” 332. 
37 Ibid., 329. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 331. 
40 Ibid., 327. 
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groups to the fact that they were not part of a patronage network.41 Moreover, these groups 
were less likely to commit acts that violated human rights.42 As an example of such groups, 
Reno described the Kamajors of Sierra Leone, which later became part of the Civil Defense 
Forces in that country.43 
On the other hand, Reno described how a group with a patron on whom it relied 
upon for resources and political protection was more aggressive towards the local 
population.44 Such a group would not need to rely on the local community for survival and 
was more disposed to commit violations of human rights.45 Reno clearly deduced that the 
more an armed group was entangled in a patronage network the more predacious and 
socially threatening it became.46  
Reno also highlighted how a change in the armed group’s structure from 
community based to having a patron was reflected in that group members’ behavior. One 
example he gave was that of the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria. Initially, this group was the 
protector of local merchants who provided its finances and it enjoyed good relations with 
the community.47 However, when the state governor recruited the group to coerce political 
rivals, there was a shift in the group’s behavior and its members started treating the civilians 
violently.48 Reno ascribed this transition due to the gained protection from the patron and 
therefore there was no need to maintain relations with the locals anymore. Similarly, a 
violent group with a patron would shift its behavior to care about the locals and embrace 
good relations with them once it had lost its patron.49 
                                                 
41 William Reno, “Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups,” Civil Wars 9, no. 4 
(December 2007): 324. 
42 Ibid. 
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44 Ibid., 333. 
45 Ibid., 324. 
46 Ibid., 336. 
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In conclusion, the patronage networks created by the rulers to ensure their personal 
protection and shield them from the perceived internal threat, undermined the formation of 
the state. This unstable form of the state was caused primarily because the coercive force 
was not concentrated nor was it unique for the state. Moreover, the rulers systematically 
weakened the state’s military, the supposed monopolistic coercive force, in order to ensure 
no coups are attempted against them. Furthermore, in order to sustain their clients, the 
rulers took advantage of the state’s resources, cut down on state expenditure and portrayed 
themselves as the sole provider of goods. Additionally, the presence of a patron rendered 
an armed group as aggressive and violent towards civilians, whereas the lack of a patron 
inclined an armed group to collaborate with the local population. Coinciding with that, the 
loss of a patron forced the group to turn to the locals, while the adoption by a patron pushed 
the group away from civilians and its members became violent and more likely to violate 
human rights. 
4. Conclusion 
In the above review, we came across two divergent theories for the main drive 
behind state formation: regular and centralized military versus irregular armed forces. Both 
incorporated the importance of waging war and obtaining legitimacy. Furthermore, the 
existence of a domestic patron has negatively affected the role of the armed group in the 
stability and formation of the state. However, an armed group with a foreign patron requires 
closer examination to deduce the possible roles of such an armed group in state-building. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The presence of a patron as a supporter and a guide for an armed group suggests 
that such a group is incentivized to advance the agenda of its patron more so over the 
interests of its state. Most probably the armed group with a patron will not have a 
constructive role in the state since the patron will prefer that this group remain dependent 
on it in order to be able to control its assets and behavior. Should the client group be part 
of a strong independent state or operate within a stable one, that would surely compromise 
that relationship and hinder the patron’s ability to exert control over its client. Therefore, 
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the armed group and its patron behind it are de-incentivized from pursuing behavior that 
would lead to a stable, centralized and independent state.  
1. First Hypothesis 
 It is likely that an armed group with a foreign patron would be disinclined to pursue 
objectives of the state should they run against the objectives of its patron. Even though the 
political groups in the country or other rival armed groups might grow to fear it due to the 
support it enjoys from its patron, my first hypothesis indicates that its popular legitimacy 
would be undermined if it were seen to be acting against national interests.  
2. Second Hypothesis 
The interaction between the armed group and local political groups and government 
organizations would have a great influence on its legitimacy in domestic politics. My 
second hypothesis indicates that the recognition from domestic politicians and other 
domestic players plays a significant part in the group’s domestic political legitimacy.  
3. Third Hypothesis 
The international status of the group’s patron might also have an influence on the 
international legitimacy of the group. My third hypothesis assumes that the better status 
the patron enjoys in the international arena, the more probable that the armed group will 
benefit from international legitimacy. Similarly, if the patron suffered from a bad 
reputation in the international arena, then that would negatively impact the international 
legitimacy of the armed group. This legitimacy would be one of the pillars for the armed 
group to be able to play a positive role in state-building. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will look at the case of the Shiite militias in Iraq. To be able to quantify 
the effect of a foreign patron on the role of an irregular armed group in state-building, three 
dimensions of the group’s legitimacy will be examined: the group’s popular legitimacy, 
domestic political legitimacy and international legitimacy. These levels of legitimacy 
coincide with the three hypotheses suggested earlier. To measure popular legitimacy, the 
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group’s relationship with the civilian population will be taken into account, as well as the 
extent to which this group is representative of that population. Moreover, to measure 
domestic political legitimacy, the group’s relationship with political entities in the country 
will be taken into consideration, and especially the interaction with the government. 
Finally, to measure international legitimacy, the group’s relationship with external entities 
will be considered, international reports that assess its conduct, as well as international 
support that it may be enjoying. 
Research sources will encompass both primary and secondary material. Primary 
sources will include government websites, official militia websites and unofficial pages on 
social media, official PMF propaganda, organizational statements, and published 
interviews with PMF leadership. In addition, Arabic and Iraqi news reports about Iraqi 
Shiite militias and the PMF will also be used. Secondary sources will include academic 
books, analytical articles and Western media reports. All resources will be in English or 
Arabic as well as translated work in those languages. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis will consist of five chapters. The first chapter will include the 
introduction, and will lay the foundation for the argument. The second chapter will contain 
a historical background of the militias constituting the PMF with a focus on the period 
between 2005 and 2011. This chapter will also include a glance on the formation of the 
patronage between the Iraqi militia and the IRGC. The third chapter will dive into the 
contribution of the Iraqi militia on the Syrian arena from 2011 through the present. This 
period also witnessed the proliferation of Iraqi armed groups that converged into the PMF. 
Moreover, the presence on the Syrian fields allowed the Iraqi militia to gain combat 
experience as well as interact with other military entities such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. 
The fourth chapter will focus on Iraq from 2013 through the present. It will cover the 
establishment of the PMF and the evolution of the organization into its current form. Most 
significant in this chapter is the formal embrace of the PMF and its fight against the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The final chapter will discuss the findings of this thesis, the 
validity of these findings and their applicability to other similar cases. 
 15 
II. ROOTS OF IRAQI SHIITE MILITIAS AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF PATRONAGE 
There are a large number of Shiite militias in Iraq with varying sizes and different 
origins. This study will focus on the largest groups, which have had a significant role in 
Iraqi politics and regional conflicts from 2005 through the present. These militias include 
the Badr Organization (Badr), Kataib Hezbollah (KH), Saraya Assalam (SA), Asaib Ahl 
al-Haq (AAH), Liwa Abu Fadel al-Abbas (LAFA), and Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliya (FAQ). 
Badr has existed for decades while the other organizations are younger, such as LAFA and 
FAQ, which were both formed in response to the war against ISIS in 2014. Also, the above 
organizations have different allegiances, which highly influence their agendas and by 
extension their organizational behavior and activities.  
This chapter will describe the main Shiite militias in Iraq, their leadership, and how 
they formed. Then it will discuss the development of the Iranian patronage over some of 
Iraqi groups from the Islamic Revolution of 1979 through the present. Even though not all 
groups are allied with Iran, the Iranian-backed ones have a significant role in the country 
and have helped advance Iran’s interests. We will also briefly touch on the increased 
Iranian influence over the Iraqi politics starting with the 2005 elections. The chapter will 
then inspect the level of popular legitimacy that the different Shiite groups enjoy in Iraq, 
where the views of different Iraqi communities are examined. It is important to look into 
different parts of Iraq to understand the different views towards the Iraqi groups. Finally, 
a comparison between Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi Shiite militias will be observed. 
We take a brief look at the creation and development of Hezbollah, and try to define some 
differences and similarities with the Iraqi groups. Iran has continuously funded and 
supported Hezbollah, whose leadership has pledged allegiance to the supreme leader, and 
all of its members have embraced wilayat al-faqih ideology. Moreover, Hezbollah has 
leveraged popular support within some Lebanese communities, and has successfully 
integrated within the political system of Lebanon. Hezbollah has formed a political wing 
whose members are actively participating in both the Lebanese parliament and 
government. Therefore, it is relevant to consider the Hezbollah model when we talk about 
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Shiite militias in Iraq, especially with the possibility that one or some of these groups might 
regard Hezbollah as an applicable model in Iraq and adopt some of its characteristics. 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Not all Shiite groups adhere to the same ideology or follow the same religious 
marjaa. A religious marjaa for the Shia is the person who is a reference in matters of 
religion. However, this religious authority is accompanied by political influence, and in the 
case of the concept of wilayat al-faqih of Iran the political influence is materialized into 
political authority. Some Iraqi Shiite groups follow Iran’s supreme leader and accept him 
as wali al-faqih. This comes with embracing his political and religious authority over any 
other forms. Other groups follow independent clerical authorities such as Grand Ayatollah 
al-Sistani or al-Haeri, whose political views are more of a guideline and less of an authority. 
Al-Sistani for example, rejects the concept of religious clerics practicing political authority 
and therefore opposes Iran’s wilayat al-faqih. 
The Badr Organization, known initially as the Badr Corps, was founded by the 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in Tehran in 1983.50 The 
nucleus of this organization was established based on the fatwa issued by Sayed Mohamad 
Baqir al-Sadr—SCIRI’s clerical leader— that called for fighting the Baath regime.51 The 
IRGC played a significant role in establishing Badr, which fell under the IRGC command 
during the entirety of the Iran-Iraq war.52 The primary constituents of Badr at the early 
stages were Iraqi Shiite expatriates who had fled to Iran to escape Saddam’s oppression 
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and Iraqi prisoners of war as well as deserters during the Iran—Iraq war.53 Badr was headed 
by the Shiite cleric Mohamad Baqir al-Hakim, who was later assassinated in 2003.54 Also 
in 2003, after the Baath regime was toppled, the group adopted the name “Badr 
Organization” in a context to signify an extension to the political arena.55 In June 2007, 
SCIRI changed its name to the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SICI).56 By removing the 
“revolution” component from the name, SICI was plotting a trajectory away from Iran. In 
2012, Badr broke off from SICI and that was announced during a press conference without 
manifesting into violence.57 Currently, the group is led by Hadi al-Ameri and is estimated 
to have 100 thousand combatants by 2016.58 Badr leadership had accepted wilayat al-faqih 
concept from the beginning by acknowledging Khomeini as the group’s religious marjaa.59 
This was evident as Iran’s supreme leader appointed the leaders of Badr.60 
The militia with the largest number of combatants was the Mehdi Army (later 
became known as Saraya Assalam), which was established in 2003. Its leader is the Shiite 
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cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, and it included around 60 thousand fighters.61 The goals of this 
group were to protect Shia holy places as well as to fight against U.S. troops. The members 
of the Mehdi Army participated in the sectarian conflict in Iraq that erupted after the 
destruction of al-Askari mosque in Samarra - the holy shrine of two Shiite Imams.62 In 
2009, al-Sadr announced the suspension of all his militia activities.63 However, when ISIS 
occupied territory in Iraq, he declared the revival of his militia in June 2014 and rebranded 
it as Saraya Assalam (Peace Companies).64 This group is very well organized and its 
members owe allegiance solely to al-Sadr. According to one article from Raseef22, an 
Arabic media platform that takes a balanced stand on Arab-related issues, Iraqi government 
officials have no control over SA, and neither do the Iranians.65 Moqtada al-Sadr does not 
recognize the authority of Iran’s supreme leader, or Iran’s theocratic ideology (wilayat al-
faqih), but rather follows a different religious marjaa. Al-Sadr falls behind the religious 
marjaa Kazim al-Haeri, who even though resides in Qom- Iran, does not subscribe to 
wilayat al-faqih.66 Despite some Iraqi media portraying that al-Sadr did not at times enjoy 
the best relations with al-Haeri, there are more recent evidence that suggests otherwise. For 
example, according to Yakein, an Iraqi media platform known to be anti-Iraqi government, 
reported in February 2017 that al-Sadr “abandoned participation in protests against the 
government because he was ordered by al-Haeri.”67 
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The relationship between Iran and al-Sadr witnessed many ups and downs. The 
period between 2003 and 2011 could be described as a cooperation between the two sides. 
Iran helped train the Mehdi Army, especially since the Iraqi group was fighting against the 
U.S. presence in Iraq. Also, al-Sadr stayed in Iran from 2008 to 2011 after the Iraqi military 
conducted a campaign against the Mehdi Army.68 In addition, after the 2010 parliamentary 
elections, Iran helped al-Sadr enter a coalition with the Iraqi prime minister al-Maliki.69 
However, after 2011, al-Sadr returned to Iraq and the relationship with Iran began to 
deteriorate. The antagonism between al-Sadr and the Iranians reached a high degree, and 
on many occasions, al-Sadr criticized the augmented influence of Iran in Iraq. During one 
of his speeches, al-Sadr described commander of the IRGC Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, 
as “the strongest man in Iraq.”70 In addition, al-Sadr accused Iran of constantly invoking 
splinters to his organization in order to weaken him and nourish other pro-Iranian groups. 
The most recent episode in the al-Sadr - Iran relations exploded after al-Sadr visited Iran’s 
regional rival, Saudi Arabia, in July 2017.71 
One of the splinters from the Mehdi Army is Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the 
Righteous), which sources disagree at what point in time exactly it formed. It started 
working independently from the Mehdi Army in 2004, renewed its ties again with al-Sadr 
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in 2005, only to break away completely by 2006.72 The leader of AAH is Qais al-Khazali.73 
This group has performed many attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces. In the consequence of 
one of those attacks in 2007, al-Khazali was arrested by Iraqi forces but was later released 
in 2010.74 AAH members and leadership fall behind wilayat al-faqih as the group explains 
on its official website.75 The group operates under the immediate supervision of the 
commander of the Quds Force.76 As a result of the enhanced support that al-Khazali 
received from Iran and the methods in which he led the group, his relationship with al-Sadr 
became contentious. Al-Sadr went as far as accusing al-Khazali and AAH behind him of 
“committing sectarian crimes.”77 On the other hand, al-Khazali and former Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nuri al-Maliki enjoyed very good relations.78  
According to Rawabet Center, an Iraqi research center that uses anti-Iran language, 
Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Battalions) consists of several Iraqi militias, which combined 
into one organization on August 21, 2007.79 These militias included Kataib Abu Fadel al-
Abbas, Kataib Karbalaa, Kataib Assijad, and Kataib Zaid Bin Ali.80 Its structure is 
enshrouded with secrecy and little is known about its leadership but it is believed that its 
secretary general is Jaafar al-Ghanimi.81 When it was established, the main goal of KH was 
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to fight U.S. troops in Iraq and this is still clearly stated on the group’s official website.82 
The spokesperson of the group, Jaafar al-Husseini, has also said during an interview in 
March 2017 to Almayadeen, a media network aligned with Iran, that “any U.S. military 
presence in Iraq under any form is considered to be an occupation force.”83 This is one of 
the groups that openly announced it belongs to wilayat al-faqih of Iran. Its leaders have 
gone as far as to declare that they would side with Iran should a war break with Iraq.84 KH 
was responsible for numerous attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces. In 2009, the U.S. 
Department of State labeled KH as a terrorist organization.85  
One of the newest Iraqi Shiite groups is Liwa Abu Fadel al-Abbas (Abou Fadel al-
Abbas Brigade), which was established at the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011.86 Unlike 
other groups, its combatants are drawn from the members of other Shiite militias like AAH, 
KH, and SA.87 Its leader is Sheikh Alaa al-Kaabi and this group was established based on 
a fatwa by the Ayatollah Qasem al-Tai.88 The group’s ideological goal is to defend the 
Shiite holy shrine of Sayyida Zainab in Damascus.89 LAFA has also participated in battles 
against ISIS alongside the Iraqi Army in Iraq.90 While the group had been formerly 
connected to Muqtada al-Sadr, the group chief cleric, al-Tai, split from al-Sadr and 
embraced Iran’s wilayat al-faqih.91 It is not clear at what point in time this split occurred, 
but one of the earliest disengagement between al-Tai and the Sadrist movement was 
                                                 
82 “About Kataib Hizbollah,” Kataib Hizbollah Official Website, accessed March 9, 2018, 
http://www.kataibhizbollah.com. 
83 “Al-Husseini: Any US military presence in Iraq is an occupation,” Almayadeen.net, March 24, 
2017, http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/763621. 
84 Aljazeera.net, “Badr, an Iraqi Militia that Fought Against Saddam and Fought alongside Assad.”  
85 “Designation of Kata'ib Hizballah,” U.S. Department of State, June 26, 2009, accessed March 11, 
2018, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143209.htm. 
86 Many sources have confused Liwa Abu Fadel al-Abbas and Kataib Abu Fadel al-Abbas. The former 
was established in 2011 after the eruption of the Syrian conflict. Whereas, the latter is composed of several 
smaller militias, which some of it later combined to create KH. 
87 Aljazeera.net, “The Most Significant Armed Shiite Groups in Iraq.”  
88 Barq Research and Studies, “Iraq: The Country of Militias.”  
89 Ibid. 
90 Aljazeera.net, “The Most Significant Armed Shiite Groups in Iraq.”  
91 Philip Smith, “Iranian Proxies Step up Their Role in Iraq,” The Washington Institute, June 13, 
2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-proxies-step-up-their-role-in-iraq. 
 22 
elaborated by Jawad al-Jabouri, who is a member of the Iraqi parliament and of Kutlat al-
Ahrar, the political party affiliated with al-Sadr. In April 2013, the Iraqi online platform 
Almada, which is pro-PMF reported that al-Jabouri “denied any ties between al-Tai and 
the Sadrist movement and that there was no connection between LAFA and the Mehdi 
Army.”92 
The most significant pro-Sistani group is Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliya (al-Abbas 
Combat Division). It has around 7000 active fighters and almost 40000 reserves.93 Initially 
this group was established in the summer of 2014 based on the fatwa of Grand Ayatollah 
Ali al-Sistani to protect the holy city of Karbala.94 The leader of the group Maitham al-
Zaidi announced in early 2015 that “the division was not affiliated with any political 
faction; however, it operated in coordination with the [Iraqi] security forces and within the 
guidance of the religious marjaa of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.”95 FAQ is mainly 
funded from the religious shrine foundations (Atabat - a term that generally refers to the 
Shiite shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf) in addition to other governmental sources.96 The 
group’s main goal is to protect the Shiite shrines in Iraq. It has also worked closely with 
the government security forces.97 FAQ, over the course of the conflict with ISIS, has 
expanded its participation in the battles alongside other Shiite militias as well as in 
cooperation with the Iraqi military. 
B. IRGC PATRONAGE AND RELATIONS WITH IRAN 
The Islamic revolution in Iran sought to adopt Shiite populations beyond its borders 
with the ambition of exporting the ideas and politics of its Islamic revolution. Iraq’s Shia 
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were one of the Islamic Republic’s primary concerns for many reasons. They were under 
the oppression of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and Khomeini having lived and studied in 
Iraq, had established strong ties with other Iraqi clergy as well as with political groups like 
Dawa party. Also, Iraq borders Iran, which implies many geostrategic interests of the latter 
in the former. Another significant reason was that Iraq contained many of the Shiite holy 
places. During the Iran-Iraq war, one of the early forms of cooperation formed between 
Iran and an Iraqi Shiite group, Badr. The latter, known at the time as the Badr Corps, fought 
alongside Iran and, as mentioned earlier, it was under the direct command of the IRGC. 
Even though the impact of Badr on the war effort was limited, later, its role became very 
significant in Iraq and the region. Badr and other more recent groups like AAH and KH 
turned into IRGC clients and helped advance Iran’s agenda as well as maintain the Islamic 
Republic’s interests in the region. Soon after the U.S. invasion and the fall of Saddam 
Hussein, Badr and the Mehdi Army became a significant political and military power 
within the new state of Iraq. Moreover, AAH, KH, and Badr served as an extension of 
Iranian power when the Assad regime in Syria needed support to survive the conflict that 
erupted in 2011. 
The IRGC, as one of the main pillars of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is a military 
organization with immense political and social power within Iran. This organization also 
supervises the Quds Force, which is IRGC’s special forces division, responsible for all 
external operations.98 Specifically, the Quds Force has engaged in developing, funding, 
and training of mostly Shiite militias and other militant organizations across the Middle 
East.99 These militia groups have turned into Iran’s clients: Iran took care of their funds 
and training and in return, they advanced Iran’s interests in the region, and practically 
became dependent on the Islamic Republic’s support for survival. Also, the Shiite groups 
amongst these Islamic militias have adopted the ideology of the IRGC. Their leaderships 
have openly embraced wilayat al-faqih concept while declaring subordination to the 
supreme leader of Iran, wali al-faqih. 
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During the Iran-Iraq war, Badr fought under the IRGC and that marked the first 
form of cooperation between an Iraqi militia and Iran. This group, in addition to fighting 
against the Iraqi army, was tasked to hold Iraqi territory taken by Iran.100 The relationships 
forged on the battlefields between Badr members and the IRGC, later paid off for both 
sides. For example, Hadi al-Ameri, during his fight with the IRGC, met people like Qasem 
Soleimani and Mourtada Qorbani who is an Iranian general, is currently head of the Iranian 
Revolution Museums Foundation, and is very close to Soleimani.101 With these high ranked 
Iranian acquaintances, al-Ameri ensured himself a good spot in the Iraqi political system. 
Reciprocally, Iran enjoyed having one of its loyal clients get to influential positions in the 
Iraqi government and help maintain Iran’s interests. 
After the U.S. toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the Shiite population was 
on the rise and so was Iranian influence. Al-Ameri and his comrades returned to Iraq and 
became engaged in politics at the local and national levels. Shiite groups, like Badr and the 
Mehdi Army, who were supported by Iran either financially or with military training, 
resorted to the use of force to advance their status and gain power. With the fall of the 
Baathist regime, there was a shift of power in favor of the Shia who constituted the majority 
of the Iraqi population.102 With elections under way, the leaders of the Iraqi Shiite militias 
at the time like Badr, the Mehdi Army and AAH were able to be holders of political seats 
or strong influencers on the outcome of votes. Al-Ameri of Badr was able to win a seat in 
the parliament in the 2005 elections.103  
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Moreover, the IRGC and Iran behind it played a significant role in shaping the 
outcome of the 2005 and 2010 Iraqi parliamentary elections as well as intervene when 
different Iraqi groups clashed. By offering political advice and financial support to its 
preferred groups as well as resorting to coercion to get its way through, Iran was able to 
increase the odds of their candidates.104 Al-Ameri’s career is just one example of the 
IRGC’s influence in the Iraqi political arena and the balance of power. Additionally, Iran 
have had an influential role in ending conflicts that involved its Iraqi Shiite clients. For 
example, it intervened when conflict broke between SCIRI and the Mehdi Army in 2007, 
and obliged them to reach a ceasefire.105 Similarly, in 2008, Iran got involved to halt the 
clashes between the Mehdi Army and the Iraqi security forces, and the Islamic Republic 
housed al-Sadr for three years.106 
C. POPULAR RECOGNITION AND EMBRACEMENT OF MILITIA 
The Iraqi Shiite militias have drawn their members from the Shiite communities. 
Some of these communities looked upon the militias as their defenders, and able men have 
joined them for a living or for religious duty. While other communities did not hold that 
same regard for the militias, especially when these militias adopted a role of violence. On 
the other hand, the Shiite militias have always tried to keep in touch with their base and 
different militias engaged in different cultural, social, and humanitarian activities. Some 
groups even established institutions that offered the communities assistance in the domain 
of health, education and financial support. Also, almost all of the militias offered some sort 
of compensation for their wounded and for the families of their “martyrs.”  
The regime of Saddam Hussein was very oppressive toward the Shiite communities 
and that was one of the initial reasons why the Shiite militias emerged. During this period, 
these militias were regarded as the defenders of the community and were embraced. The 
Shiite community saw the fighters as the ones sacrificing themselves to achieve a better 
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life for its people. However, during the war with Iran when Badr was fighting on the side 
of the Iranians and the Iranians were sending messages to the Iraqi Shia to revolt, the Shiite 
community did not respond enthusiastically. Even Khomeini himself delivered a speech 
where he asked the Iraqis to rise against Saddam and he asked them to join Iran in its 
fight.107 Despite, the bad conditions that the Shia were suffering, they did not answer to 
foreign calls and not many joined the militias fighting with the Iranians. 
After the U.S. invasion and the creation of the new Iraqi state, the weaknesses of 
the governmental institutions left a void that the Shiite militias were eager to fill. This was 
obvious in the high rate of unemployment, the lack of development plans in rural areas, 
and the absence of social services. Many of the young men in the Shiite population have 
joined the militias to provide for their families as unemployment spread. In addition, the 
salaries of the militia members exceeded what the university professors were getting at the 
end of the month.108 Also, belonging to one of the militias afforded these men with 
protection from abuses of other militias’ members.109 
Moreover, the Shiite militias have assumed development roles and carried out 
social services in the areas that they control or reside in. For example, SA displayed in its 
official magazine Rosol the group’s contributions to the community. In the first edition of 
the magazine, the group claimed to distribute aids to the displaced families due to the 
fighting with ISIS.110 Also included in that same edition, the group showed pictures of its 
members painting the walls in the city of Samaraa.111 Similarly, FAQ declared on its 
official website a nationwide campaign to support the educational system in Iraq. The 
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campaign began in the governorate of al-Mathna and included educational courses for 
students as well as maintenance and rehabilitation for schools and educational facilities.112 
In a similar approach, KH has established a number of institutions that take up 
different roles from religious to educational and social. A brief description of these 
institutions could be viewed on the official website of the group. For example, the Hadaf 
institution is involved in religious studies and in the safeguarding of the Islamic culture.113 
Another institution, the Zainabiyat, claims to promote the role of women in the society and 
holds awareness sessions, seminars, and festivals around the country, of course all within 
the religious ideology of the group.114 In addition, the institution of al-Nokhob al-
Akadimiya (the academic elite) asserts to support education and research as well as 
organizing seminars, lectures, and exhibitions.115 
After al-Sistani issued his Fatwa of “al Jihad al Kafai” urging all able men to join 
the Iraqi security forces for the defense of the country against ISIS, almost all Shiite 
volunteers joined the militias instead of the military.116 It is worth looking into this point 
to try to understand the overwhelming support the Shiite population showed for the militias 
and not for the Iraqi army or the security forces in general. One possible explanation is the 
increased level of Shia mistrust in the Army due to the catastrophic defeat that the Iraqi 
Army suffered from as a smaller number of ISIS fighters took over four cities in Iraq.117 
Even the head of government at the time hinted to a “conspiracy” being behind the retreat 
or defeat of the Iraqi Army.118 It was clear that the Shiite population had lost faith in the 
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Army and saw the militias as more dedicated and able in fighting ISIS. Another explanation 
is the mistrust towards any governmental-run organization and its methods of recruitments. 
The possible absence of any mechanism to absorb such a large and sudden number of 
volunteers into the security forces may have deterred the Shia responding to the fatwa from 
seeking such channels. If the Iraqi government were maintaining a balance between the 
number of recruits and their corresponding religious and sectarian origins, then it would 
decline such large numbers from the Shiite population alone. Perhaps still a possible reason 
for joining the militia is the religious tendency of these groups. A pious Shiite man would 
assume that joining such organizations to be more fulfilling for his religious aspirations 
and for meeting the call of the religious fatwa. 
The Sunni population in Iraq has a very different view of the Shiite militias. After 
the Baathist regime fell, the Sunnis, being the minority, soon realized the Shia’s ambition 
for dominance. The Sunnis considered the presence and the growth of the Shiite militias as 
being the tools used to achieve that dominance and take control of the country by force. 
They accused those militias of sectarian violence and of practicing demographic changes 
by replacing Sunnis with Shias. According to some sources, the Shiite militias were 
accused of at least 17 demographic changes in places like Jirf Assakhir, al-Mahmoudiyi, 
Samuraa, Baakouba, al-Mikdadiyi and others.119 In these cases, the militias expelled Sunni 
families and replaced them by others from the Shiite population. Also, the Sunnis have 
accused the AAH to have committed the most violent violations against them, where they 
claim that this group has executed many Sunnis without a trial and has attacked their 
mosques.120 
Similarly, the Kurds, having their own ambitious plans of an independent nation, 
have clashed with the Shiite militias on several occasions. For example, after the Kurdish 
Peshmerga took control of the town of Sinjar from ISIS, tensions rose between the Kurds 
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and the Shiite militias. As a result, AAH engaged in terrorizing the Kurdish residents of 
Baghdad and expelled many Kurdish families from that city; such incidents were reported 
by Al-Quds Al Arabi, a populist Arab nationalist newspaper.121 Also, after the Kurds 
overwhelmingly supported their independence from Iraq in the referendum on September 
25, 2017, the Shiite militias moved to confront the Kurdish forces in Kirkuk. As a result, 
the militias took over the city and the surrounding oil fields where the Peshmerga quickly 
withdrew with a limited firefight between the two parties.122 
D. COMPARISON TO THE LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH 
We have taken a brief look at some of the main Iraqi Shiite militias, the 
circumstances of their formation, and their ideological alignment. Also, we have 
highlighted the groups that enjoyed the support of Iran the most and the role that Iran played 
for those groups. Then we attempted to weigh the degree to which the different Shiite 
groups had the backing of the Iraqi population, as well as evaluated the level of their 
engagement with the population. Since Lebanese Hezbollah present a similar Iranian 
venture but with a different outcome than the Iraqi counterpart, it seems relevant to look 
into the history of the Lebanese group and deduce where things went differently and why 
we do not have the Hezbollah model in Iraq yet. Hezbollah has, to a certain extent, gained 
the support of the Shiite population in Lebanon, and in some points in time of other 
Lebanese communities. Also, Hezbollah has formed a political wing that was effective and 
successful in riding the Lebanese political system, and continues to win seats in the 
Lebanese government and parliament. Additionally, Hezbollah has allied with other 
Lebanese political groups and exerts a level of influence within the Lebanese government. 
To discuss Lebanese Hezbollah in sufficient detail would require extensive writing, which 
is outside the scope of this study. For the purpose of this thesis, I will only go into the 
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origin of this group, the Iranian patronage, and some similarities and differences with the 
Iraqi Shiite militias.  
On June 6, 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and reached the outskirts of Beirut.123 The 
Shiite population in Lebanon and especially in the occupied South did not resist the Israelis 
in the first few months.124 However, by the end of 1983, attacks on the Israelis intensified 
and the Lebanese resistance started to manifest itself.125 At the beginning, AMAL was the 
dominant resistance force and the prime Shiite group and it was in control of the Lebanese 
National Resistance (LNR).126 Hezbollah fighters were operating under the LNR and the 
group did not declare its existence until 1985.127 The two Shiite groups grew in rivalry and 
eventually engaged in a vicious conflict in May 1988.128 The conflict did not end until an 
agreement was reached between Syria and Iran the respective sponsors of AMAL and 
Hezbollah.129 
The Iranians had sent its Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon soon after the Israeli 
invasion and as Hezbollah grew and became more organized, Iran was investing more into 
this Shiite militia. It is estimated that 1500 Revolutionary Guards arrived to the Beqaa 
region of Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in 1982.130 Many of the Lebanese clerics 
who had attended their theological studies in Najaf defected from AMAL and formed into 
Hezbollah as they ideologically aligned with the Islamic Republic. One of those clerics is 
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who became head of Hezbollah from 1992.131 At the declaration 
of its existence, Hezbollah released a manifesto on 16 February 1985 orienting itself within 
wilayat al-faqih and accepting Khomeini as its supreme leader.132 In return, Hezbollah was 
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receiving financial and military support from Iran. According to some sources, the militia 
was getting around 140 million dollars a year.133 Other sources put the figures received by 
Hezbollah between five and ten million dollars per month.134 
Hezbollah enjoys a large public base in Lebanon, which is not limited to the Shiite 
population. This is mainly because Lebanese in general and southerners in particular 
considered that it was defending Lebanon from external aggressors, and because Hezbollah 
has formed a substantial social welfare that benefited different Lebanese constituents. The 
support of people from different parts of Lebanon was particularly obvious during the 
offense that Israel launched in 1996 under the name “The Grapes of Wrath.” For example, 
a Christian woman donated 15,000 dollars to Hezbollah and she requested that they 
purchase rockets with that sum.135 Also, after every attack that Israel carried out, the Shiite 
militia would rebuild the destruction that was caused.136 Moreover, Hezbollah has created 
a social welfare system that offered a spectrum of services, which many non-Shia benefited 
from as well. The Health Committee of Hezbollah established more than forty health 
centers in different regions of the country.137 Another of its institutions, Jihad al-Bina, 
engaged in construction where schools, low cost housing, and other infrastructure projects 
were carried out.138 
As soon as Lebanon was ready to hold parliamentary elections at the end of the 
civil war in 1992, Hezbollah decided to have candidates run and created a political wing. 
The supreme leader of Iran at that time, Ali Khamenei, asked Hezbollah to participate in 
those elections.139 It won several seats and ended up with eight members in the 
parliament.140 Over the course of the years, politicians in Lebanon regarded Hezbollah’s 
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presentation as a political party to be remarkable.141 Therefore, Hezbollah was able to work 
within the system and did not attempt to take over the order in Lebanon.142 
Comparing the Lebanese Hezbollah to the Iraqi Shiite militias, we can see some 
similarities in the events surrounding both as well as some key differences that rendered 
different outcomes. Militias from both countries are from the Shiite population and both 
have been marginalized for a long time by their respective country’s political system. Also, 
Iran has attempted to export its revolution to both places and has spread its ideology to the 
groups that it supported in both countries. However, the commitment of the Lebanese group 
and the Shia behind it are an indication of the success of Iran’s goals in Lebanon whereas 
in Iraq, Iran was less successful in achieving dominance in the Shia realm.  
The differences between the two countries stem from the circumstances arising in 
each as well as differences in Iran’s approach. First, the Lebanese Hezbollah’s main goal 
was to fight the Israeli occupation that gave the militia a popular legitimacy that surpassed 
its immediate population. While in Iraq, even though at the beginning the Shiite militias 
were confronting an oppressive regime, they were not representative of the whole 
population. Furthermore, in recent years, the Shiite militias were fighting against Sunni 
and Kurdish Iraqi groups. Second, Iran’s support did not alienate Hezbollah in Lebanon as 
much as the Shiite groups in Iraq, especially during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Third, 
Iran concentrated its support on one Shiite group in Lebanon, while in Iraq it supported 
several groups. This gave an advantage to Hezbollah who was able to maximize its efforts, 
while the Iraqi groups had to compete amongst each other to become favored and win more 
support, which distracted their efforts. Fourth, the presence of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani 
in Iraq as a major theological reference is a continuous challenge to the supremacy of wali 
al-faqih. On the other hand, in Lebanon it was much easier for the Shia to adopt the Iranian 
model in the absence of Shiite theological rivals to wali al-faqih. Finally, the welfare 
system created by Hezbollah benefited different populations although directed toward the 
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Shiite one, whereas in Iraq the community services offered by the militias were less 
sophisticated and were solely intended for the Shiite communities. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the most important Shiite militias in Iraq. They belong 
to three different categories. The first category, which contains the groups that get the most 
support from Iran, includes Badr, AAH, KH, and LAFA. The second category contains the 
group that belongs to the political line of al-Sadr and that is the SA. The third category, 
which contains groups aligned with the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, includes FAQ. This 
chapter has also discussed Iran’s role and influence in Iraq, and how the Islamic Republic 
has intervened in that country on various occasions. Then the chapter considered the 
different communities in Iraq and their perspective of the Shiite militias’ actions and how 
each community perceived these groups. While the Shiite communities may support the 
Shiite militias, the Sunni and the Kurdish communities are not comfortable with the roles 
that these groups have assumed. Finally, this chapter looked briefly into the Lebanese 
Hezbollah’s history and development. There were some similarities between the Lebanese 
Shiite group and the Iraqi Shiite groups, but the circumstances in Iraq and Iran’s approach 
in that country were different from in Lebanon, and those were enough to lead to a different 
outcome in Iraq. 
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III. IRAQI SHIITE MILITIAS IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT  
The 2011 political protests that erupted in Syria during what became known to be 
the Arab Spring quickly broke into a fully-fledged civil war that encompassed all of Syria. 
The minority Alawite dominating the government found itself in direct conflict with the 
Sunni majority that formed many competing armed groups. The chaos was exploited by 
terrorist groups including Al Qaeda’s affiliate, which quickly split into two—Nusra Front 
and ISIS—after entering the Syrian conflict. Outside powers also intervened at different 
levels, with the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey all aiding elements of the 
rebellion, and Iran and Russia backing the Assad regime. Additionally, Israel kept a close 
eye on the shaping of events, and intermittently carried out airstrikes on occasions that 
Israeli officials described as crossing red lines by Hezbollah. 
Iran’s rush to aid the Assad regime included the introduction of Iraqi Shiite militias 
into Syria by 2013. For the Iraqi fighters and Iran, the militias were said to be involved in 
a religious task: the defense of the holy Shrine of Sayyida Zainab in Damascus. The Iraqis 
were not the only Iran-backed groups to show up for the fight. Combatants from Lebanese 
Hezbollah were actively participating in the conflict as soon as 2012, and the newly-
established Iranian foreign legions (the Afghan Fatimaiyun, and the Pakistani Zainabiyun) 
also joined the Syria campaign by the end of 2013. The Iraqi Shiite militias in Syria became 
part of a transnational Shiite alliance whose efforts were commanded and coordinated by 
Iran.143  
This chapter will start with a brief historical context of the Syrian conflict, and it 
will describe the interventions of the different countries that got directly and indirectly 
involved in the conflict. This section will introduce the intervening countries in the 
chronological order that they intervened, and therefore events will follow a chronological 
sequence only within the context of each country. We will then delve deeper into the 
Iranian intervention, which involved the Islamic Republic’s Shiite clients in the region. 
Additionally, we will shed light on the dynamics playing within the Iraqi political arena 
                                                 
143 Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 217. 
 36 
regarding the participation of Iraqi Shiite militias in the Syrian conflict. Finally, we will 
inspect the expertise that the Shiite Iraqi fighters have acquired in Syria, especially with 
regard to cooperating and coordinating with other military entities. 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT 
In March 2011, demonstrations filled the cities of Syria. Government security 
forces cracked down on the protesters with extreme force, killing and injuring numerous 
people in the process. The regime’s use of violence triggered more massive demonstrations 
across the country. Soon, the people started fighting back and “rebel” groups started 
forming as they called for a revolution similar to what had taken place in Tunisia and Egypt 
earlier that year. By the end of 2012, Syria had lapsed into an all-encompassing civil war 
where Arab Sunni rebels supported by some Arab countries were gaining ground fast.144 
In addition, some groups fighting the Assad regime had a more extreme agenda and turned 
into jihadist groups. Such jihadist groups were aiming to create an Islamic state and their 
ideology alienated non-jihadist groups.  
The sectarian aspect in the Syrian conflict had its roots in the history of the country 
and in the way the Assad regimes ruled the country. Since the times of the Ottomans, 
sectarianism had been used to divide Syrian society, and the Assad family has used these 
divisions to consolidate its power.145 Assad put Alawites in essential official positions and 
by 2011, 70% of state employees were Alawites.146 In addition, the majority of the minority 
groups like the Christians and Druze plus the wealthy Sunnis who had built up their wealth 
due to good relations with the regime, sided with Assad. Therefore, non-Sunni, non-
Muslim minorities and wealthy Sunnis did not join the rebels, which formed mostly from 
lower class Sunnis. Additionally, the regime unleashed the shabiha (pro-regime gangsters), 
who intimidated protestors and even participated in sectarian kidnappings and killings. 
According to a BBC report, witnesses have claimed that as early as June 2011, thousands 
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of shabiha were engaged in such actions.147 The crimes committed by the shabiha against 
Sunnis only aggravated the sectarian division and fueled the Jihadist narrative. The 
extremist groups then easily found recruits among the Sunni population who became 
polarized against Alawites and Shias. Later, ISIS would readily target Shiite and Alawite 
civilians and not just the Shiite combatants.148  
Furthermore, almost every armed group in Syria, whether a rebel group or a jihadist 
group, fought against other such armed groups in its vicinity. In April 2016, ISIS killed a 
high-ranking member of Ahrar al-Sham.149 Also, fighting often broke between ISIS on one 
side and Ahfad al-Rasoul in Rakka or the Northern Storm Brigade on the other.150 Still the 
most recorded number of clashes took place between ISIS and al-Nusra Front. They fought 
against each other in different places in Syria from Deir Azour, to Kalamoun and Southern 
Damascus.  
The Turkish involvement in the Syrian war started early on in the conflict. It began 
when Turkey hosted Syrian opposition members on its territory and allowed their forces to 
conduct attacks across its borders.151 Turkey was also the destination of many Syrian 
officers who defected from the Syrian military.152 Over the course of the war, the Turkish 
forces were directly involved in the Syrian conflict and have entered Syrian territories on 
two occasions so far. The first operation code-named “Diri’ al-Fourat” was launched on 
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August 24, 2016 to capture the city of Jarablus.153 The offensive contained large numbers 
of Syrian opposition group members and was directed against both ISIS and the Kurdish 
forces in Northern Syria.154 The second operation code-named “Ghoson al-Zaitoun” or the 
Olive Branch began on January 20, 2018 with the purpose to capture the town of Efreen 
and the surrounding region.155 Unlike the first operation, this one was directed solely 
against Kurdish forces, as Turkey aimed to clear the Syrian-Turkish borders from any 
Kurdish presence.156 
Israel also began to gradually intervene in the conflict since May 2012. While 
Israel’s role at first was limited to providing medical support for the rebels near its borders, 
it progressed to artillery shelling of bordering regions of the Golan heights, and then its 
operations became bolder over time and started reaching further into Syria. As early as 
February 2013, Israel took in seven injured rebels from the Golan Heights and 
accommodated them in a hospital in Safad.157 Although Israel did not get boots on the 
ground in Syria, it continued to conduct airstrikes on what it described as Hezbollah 
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attempts to move strategic weapon systems to Lebanon.158 Eventually, Israel was 
conducting strikes against Syrian military facilities as far as Damascus. On May 5, 2013, a 
military research facility was destroyed by Israeli rockets.159 Israel was also already very 
sensitive to Syrian fighters flying close to its borders, and on September 23, 2014, Israeli 
air defense shot down a Syrian fighter jet over the Golan area after the Israelis claimed it 
had crossed the borders.160 Another kind of Israeli intervention was assassinations of 
members of Hezbollah or of other organizations working with the Lebanese group to 
organize a resistance force against Israel in Southern Syria.161 For example, Samir al-
Qintar, who was a prominent member of Hezbollah was killed in an Israeli airstrike in 
Jermana South of Damascus on December 19, 2015.162 
The U.S. became significantly involved in the Syrian conflict when it began 
conducting airstrikes against ISIS. The U.S. led coalition, which included Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, and Bahrain, started operating over Syria on 
September 22, 2014.163 Later on as the air campaign continued, the airstrikes also targeted 
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at least a couple of Syrian army posts, in addition to some pro-government fighters. In 
September 2016, a U.S. airstrike unintentionally targeted a Syrian post where 62 Syrian 
troops were killed and 100 were injured.164 On April 6, 2017, the United States launched a 
missile attack on the al-Sharyat airfield in Syria as a response to a chemical attack carried 
out by the regime that killed civilians.165 This attack was the first direct strike against Syrian 
government forces. Also, on May 19, 2017, the coalition executed an airstrike on a caravan 
of pro-regime forces in Southern Syria.166 The following month on June 6, 2017, the 
coalition carried out another air strike against pro-regime forces near Tanaf, which is a 
region relatively close to the borders with Iraq and Jordon.167 Additionally, In June 2017, 
a U.S. Navy Super Hornet shot down a Syrian Su-22 fighter over the town of Jaadin in 
Syria.168 More recently, on February 8, 2018, 100 combatants from forces allied with the 
Syrian regime were killed when coalition forces conducted airstrikes and halted an attack 
on the headquarters of Syrian Democratic Forces in the countryside of Deir Ezzor in eastern 
Syria.169 
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Russia caught the world by surprise when it announced on September 30, 2015 that 
it was sending aircrafts and troops into Syria to fight against what it labeled as terrorist 
groups.170 This intervention came at a time when the Assad regime had lost control of most 
of the territory in the country, retained governance only of the capital and few minority 
towns, whereas the rest of the country was under the power of different rebel groups. Most 
of the Russian airstrikes came against what is considered the moderate rebel forces rather 
than against ISIS or other terrorist organizations.171 There is some evidence to suggest that 
Iran was the sponsor of the agreement between Russia and Syria, and particularly, Qassem 
Soleimani, the IRGC Quds Force chief, to be the “architect of the Russian intervention in 
Syria.”172 The official story behind the Russian intervention was that the Syrian president 
requested Russian military support.173 Moreover, one of the most notable and controversial 
Russian contributions to Syria was the deployment of sophisticated Air Defense systems 
in various locations throughout the country.174 
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B. MISSION TO SYRIA AND PROLIFERATION OF IRAQI MILITIA 
For Iran, the war in Syria presented a challenge as well as an opportunity. On the 
one hand, its only Arab state ally was seriously threatened and along with it, the support 
route to Lebanese Hezbollah was compromised.175 On the other hand, the conflict 
presented Iran with the opportunity to increase its influence over an important part of the 
Middle East and to extend the presence of its troops and allied proxies near the borders of 
Israel. Ideologically, providing protection for the shrine of Sayyida Zainab was used as a 
pretext for the IRGC to get involved in Syria and to muster its Iraqi clients for the fight in 
addition to other Shiite clients.176 The mission to Syria became framed as a religious 
obligation to defend the family of the prophet against Sunni extremism. New groups were 
formed in Iraq for the purpose of this conflict and their attitude was shaped in ways to gain 
access to Iranian generosity. Furthermore, the importance of Syria for Iran was stressed by 
several former and current commanders of the IRGC and the Basij. On several occasions, 
such prominent figures would recall Syria’s role in the past alongside the Islamic republic 
and reaffirm Iran’s commitment to the security of Syria.177 It was clear that Iran viewed 
the war in Syria as existential in nature and intervened accordingly. 
Iran started with a limited covert support campaign that evolved into an extensive 
presence on the ground and Iranians participated in battles in almost every part of Syria. 
The Iranian secret support consisted of transferring of weapons and ammo as well as 
advisors into Damascus.178 By May 2012, Quds Force officials were openly announcing 
that IRGC units were assisting the Syrian Army.179 Perhaps the greatest contribution of the 
IRGC in the Syrian war was the formation of pro-regime paramilitary forces that came to 
be known as National Defense Forces (NDF).180 The members of these forces were trained 
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and equipped by the Iranians, and the NDF were involved in most major operations.181 
Meanwhile, the number of IRGC personnel in Syria was constantly increasing, and by 
February 2014, few hundred commanders as well as thousands of Basij members were 
there.182 The Iranian public opinion remained supportive of the role Iran has assumed and 
the religious and strategic justification given effectively swayed their opinion in favor of 
intervention.183 
Additionally, Iran directed its Shiite clients to participate in the war effort to support 
the Syrian regime. These groups were religiously motivated as well, and moved in to 
protect Sayyida Zainab shrine in addition to directly support Syrian forces. The main 
mission according to those Shiite combatants was to defend the honor of the prophet by 
protecting the holy shrine of Sayyida Zainab from the Sunni extremist groups. For the Iraqi 
groups, religious justification was not as abundant as one might assume. Both al-Sistani 
and Moqtada al-Sadr were not supportive of Iraqis going to Syria to join the fight.184 Al-
Sistani described going to Syria as “not of the general interest and did not achieve any 
reform.”185 Nonetheless, Grand Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, whom many Iraqi fighters 
emulate, considered fighting in Syria religiously acceptable.186 Moreover, Iran’s Supreme 
leader, Ali Khamenei continuously framed the conflict as a universal war between Islam 
and infidelity.187 This alignment of religious leaders was no surprise and of course, it 
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further justified the presence of the Iraqi groups in Syria. Such groups included Asaib Ahl 
al-Haq (AAH), Kataib Hezbollah (KH), Liwa Abu Fadel al-Abbas (LAFA), and Badr 
Organization (Badr).188 
This period witnessed a proliferation of Shiite militias in Iraq and many of the 
newly formed ones participated in the fight in Syria. A large number of these new militias 
could be seen as splinters from existing groups, yet it is unclear whether the recent groups 
operated autonomously or whether they were formations under the main groups. For 
example, Harakat al-Nujaba, which started operation under AAH soon broke off to form 
its own group and became active in Damascus and Aleppo.189 Some groups were even 
formed with combatants from different militias. For example, LAFA, which first appeared 
in August 2012 near Sayyida Zainab, consisted of fighters from AAH, KH, SA, and 
Badr.190 It was as though these groups were units within a larger formation where a higher 
authority was mixing and matching personnel to create the appropriate structure for each 
front. Other Iraqi groups fighting in Syria either were created under the direct supervision 
of the IRGC or instantly acquired its support. For example, Saraya al-Khorasani, which 
was established in 2013 as a military wing for the Islamic Taleaa party with the sole 
purpose of defending the holy shrines in Syria, quickly displayed allegiance for Khamenei 
and attained Iranian support.191 According to Noon Post, which is an Arabic media platform 
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that adopts a criticizing stand toward the PMF, by early 2016, we could count as many as 
22 Iraqi groups actively fighting in Syria.192 Most of these groups did not exist before the 
civil war broke out in that country. Consequently, new splinters, subgroups, and groups 
under Iranian command contributed to the proliferation of Iraqi Shiite militias between 
Syria and Iraq. 
While the Shiite political constituents in Iraq either were involved with the militias 
or at least were silent about their participation, other political constituents raised their 
voices in protest. In December 2016, Ousama al-Noujeifi, the head of the Sunni political 
block “Moutahidoun” (United in English) and the Iraqi vice president demanded that the 
Iraqi government prohibit Iraqi militias from fighting in Syria alongside the Syrian 
regime.193 Al-Noujeifi expressed his concern over the fact that these groups were part of 
the al-hashd al-shaabi, the Arabic term for PMF, which had become a governmental 
security institution by November 2016, and therefore they must be controlled by the 
government and can only be authorized by the parliament.194 In return, spokesman Hashem 
al-Mousawi of Harakat al-Nujaba, which was fighting in Aleppo at the time, fired back at 
al-Noujeifi and accused him and his political line behind him of being traitors and of 
stirring up sectarian division among the people of Iraq and the region.195 On the other hand, 
PM al-Abadi had an unclear position regarding the presence of members of the PMF in 
Syria. He said in August 2017 that “outside Iraq al-hashd does not exist. Al-hashd al-
shaabi is an official body that exists inside of Iraq and its borders alone. You will not find 
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al-hashd forces outside of Iraq’s borders.”196 It is as if the PMF members are held 
accountable by the Iraqi government only for what they do in Iraq. 
The Kurds, being a constituent of Syria and Iraq, were part of conflicts on both 
sides of the borders. Despite facing a common enemy in Syria and Iraq, Iraqi Kurds and 
the Iraqi Shiite groups were on a collision course over the future of the Kurdish area as 
well as over disputed regions with the central government. Kurds exist in Syria, Iraq, 
Turkey, and Iran and have always had a dream of creating a nation. The best thing they had 
accomplished so far was regional autonomy in Northern Iraq. Additionally, since the 
Syrian regime allowed the Syrian Kurds to hold ground and did not fight them in Northern 
Syria, the Kurds and the Syrian regime along with its Iraqi supporters belonged in a way 
to the same camp against ISIS. Nonetheless, things in Iraq were heating up, especially since 
the Kurds were aiming for more independence and at the same time trying to expand the 
territory that they controlled. Eventually, Kurdish forces and Iraqi Shiite militias clashed, 
though to a limited extent, after the Kurdish independence referendum and over the 
disputed city of Kirkuk.197 The Shiite militias were able to gain control over Kirkuk and 
many violations against Kurdish civilians were recorded.198 Moreover, on one occasion in 
2015, Masrour al-Barazani, the son of the Kurdish leader Masoud al-Barazani, announced 
that the Shiite militias in Iraq were more dangerous than ISIS.199 
C. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER MILITARY 
ENTITIES 
Since Iran was the prime supporter of the Syrian regime and the former had 
marshaled all its regional clients for the conflict, the Iraqi Shiite groups operating there 
evolved from simply being part of the IRGC’s regional network into becoming part of a 
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transnational Shiite entity commanded by Iran. They learned to work in coordination with 
other militias, IRGC units, and the Syrian Army. The Iraqi groups were operating in 
different parts of Syria, with a concentration in Damascus and Aleppo. They coordinated 
with Lebanese Hezbollah, who in many occasions would be taking the lead in the offenses. 
The Iraqi groups also worked under the direct supervision of the IRGC. Moreover, they 
supported the Syrian Army in many of the battles, and benefited from air support provided 
by the Syrian regime and the Russians. 
All of the Iraqi fighters on the fields of Syria belonged to groups that were backed 
by Iran. These groups were committed to the ideology of wilayat al-faqih, and the fight in 
Syria reinforced that identity as the Iraqi combatants connected with other like-minded 
groups holding similar religious commitments and objectives.200 Moreover, the QF 
assumed operational command of these groups and was managing their tactical movements 
through direct presence of QF officers on the ground. These militias were trained, equipped 
and funded by the IRGC and the QF, and therefore, they were under extensive Iranian 
influence.201 Working under the IRGC, these groups were gaining a new and different 
military experience, one that was closer to conventional warfare rather than irregular 
combat. 
If the IRGC provided sponsorship, then Lebanese Hezbollah became the mentor of 
the Iraqi groups in Syria. It became evident as the war progressed that the IRGC depended 
on Lebanese Hezbollah to train the Shiite groups fighting in Syria and in some occasions 
to lead them.202 For example, Hezbollah had the main role in coordinating the efforts of 
the Shiite fighters that included Iraqi groups to secure the Syria-Iraq border.203 Moreover, 
getting in contact with the Lebanese fighters, the Iraqi groups were exposed to Hezbollah’s 
fighting tactics as well as its members’ commitment to the cause. It was a fact that Iran 
considered the Lebanese Hezbollah experience as one of its success stories in exporting the 
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revolution.204 Iran would want its Iraqi clients to adopt a similar approach in growing to 
such an entity in their respective country. The battlefields of Syria provided the appropriate 
bond between these groups to learn from one another. However, it is hard to tell which of 
the Iraqi groups Iran was focusing on. Especially since it was continuously sponsoring new 
splinters, was not trying to maintain coherence among any group, and did not seem to be 
mindful of additional divisions among the Iraqi militias. 
In addition to working with Hezbollah, the Iraqi militias were providing support for 
the Syrian Army. One of the main reasons why these groups were directed to Syria was the 
fact that the Syrian Army was losing ground and barely holding on. Although their early 
presence was around the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus, Iraqi groups were soon 
needed in different parts of Syria. LAFA combatants were fighting in Qalamoun and along 
the Damascus airport highway front.205 Liwa Zou al-Fiqar joined the battles in Aadra and 
on the airport highway.206 Additionally, Badr fought in Southern Damascus and in the 
Ghouta al-Sharkiya.207 It was not clear how much direct coordination happened between 
the Syrian Army and the Iraqi Shiite militias at the leadership level; however, at the tactical 
level, the fighters on both sides did not interact much. One captured Syrian officer talked 
about the conflict in South-West Aleppo and described the situation on the ground in detail: 
We were getting orders during the fight in Aleppo from an Iranian field 
commander through radio communications. We did not fight side by side 
with the foreign militias and we were not supposed to approach them. In 
addition, the militias used to hide from us the true numbers of casualties that 
they incurred. Our area of operations included fighters from Lebanese 
Hezbollah as well as Iraqi militias and some from Afghanistan. The 
members of these militias were getting paid 2000 U.S. dollars each month, 
while we were only getting 25 thousand Syrian Liras, which is the 
equivalent of 62 U.S. dollars.208 
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Furthermore, from the instance that the Russian air force started bombing targets in 
Syria, the leaders of the Iraqi Shiite groups rejoiced at the event. Hadi al-Ameri of Badr 
praised the Russian intervention in Syria and called that it should be extended to cover Iraq 
as well.209 Similarly, a spokesperson from AAH described the effective results from the 
Russian airstrikes against ISIS and compared them with the “ineffective” campaign 
conducted by the international coalition.210 Additionally, in the battle for Aleppo in 2016, 
the Iraqi Shiite militias fighting alongside the regime benefited from direct air support from 
the Russian air force.211 Therefore, the Iraqi fighters were learning to conduct ground 
offences in conjunction with air strikes and support from conventional forces. This kind of 
experience would probably enhance their combat abilities beyond a militia’s irregular 
warfare tactics and would shift it more toward conventional military tactics. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has briefly looked into the Syrian conflict and described the various 
outside actors intervening in that war. The Syrian conflict started with popular 
demonstrations against the regime and soon turned into a civil war with Sunni rebel groups 
fighting against an Alawite dominated regime. We saw how some countries sided with the 
rebellion and other countries sided with the regime. However, it is worth commenting that 
the actors siding with the rebels had different and sometimes conflicting agendas and 
therefore did not coordinate that much. Whereas the actors supporting the regime were 
relatively more coherent and managed to coordinate better. 
Additionally, we discussed how Shiite militias under the command of Iran 
converged into Syria and along with IRGC units supported the regime. Among those 
groups were some of the Iraqi Shiite militias. Many of the Shiite groups, foreign and local 
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to Syria, were formed for the purpose of this conflict. They were united in their ideology 
and they perceived their mission as being religious and of a higher cause. Moreover, the 
Iranian presence was gradually increasing in Syria as the war progressed, and to the 
Iranians, this conflict had turned to an existential one and the Iranian public opinion 
remained in favor of intervention. On the other hand, the mood in Iraq was not as uniform, 
and there were many religious and political voices condemning participation in the Syrian 
war. 
In this chapter, we have also made the point that the Iraqi Shiite militias fighting in 
Syria have gained additional military experiences. They have learned how to operate under 
air support from the Russians. They have also worked as support groups for the Syrian 
military, a conventional force. More importantly, they have become able to coordinate with 
other military entities and other Shiite militias in the region under Iranian command. This 
has allowed the Iraqi militias to create regional networks as well as learn from the more 
experienced groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah. All these dynamics indicate that the Iraqi 
Shiite militias have become part of a transnational Shiite force that will have an impact on 
the balance of power in the region and whose influence will not be limited to the Syrian 
battlefields as the Iranians might tend to use that force elsewhere. 
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IV. FORMATION OF THE PMF 
We have seen that members of some Iraqi Shiite militias crossed the borders into 
Syria and participated in the fight alongside the Syrian regime. However, in 2014 the 
militias’ concentration shifted back home. The Popular Mobilization Forces (Arabic: al-
hashd al-shaabi, or al-hashd) is the umbrella organization that holds the diverse factions 
of Iraqi Shiite militias. Many of the militias that became part of the PMF existed before it 
was established. However, the events in the second half of 2014 allowed these militias to 
grow enormously as well as to give way to the formation of new groups. This chapter will 
describe the events that led to the formation of the PMF as well as the religious and political 
factors that helped legitimize their existence and fortify their roles. Then it will delve into 
the fight against ISIS and how it progressed with continuous victories over the terrorist 
organization. We will also look into the details of the abuses and destruction inflicted by 
members of the PMF on non-Shia civilians in the midst of the fighting. Furthermore, we 
take a look at how the PMF is viewed by some of the main state actors in the region, and 
how they translated that into cooperation or conflict. Finally, we will discuss the role of 
the PMF after the defeat of ISIS, while taking into consideration the Iraqi government’s 
options and the militias expectations for that role. 
A. HOW THE PMF FORMED  
In June 2014, ISIS was able to take control of large spaces of territory in Iraq and 
to occupy some of the major cities. On June 10, the terrorist organization took over the city 
of Mosul, the second largest city of Iraq.212 The fighting that went on for only five days 
ended with the sudden withdrawal of the entire police force from the city as well as three 
Iraqi army corps.213 The overall number of Iraqi forces that deserted the city were estimated 
                                                 






between 40,000 and 50,000 men.214 Whereas ISIS forces were estimated at only 800 
men.215 ISIS members went on then to capture the abandoned military weapons and 
vehicles. They also freed almost 12,000 prisoners from city jails.216 In addition, ISIS looted 
cash from local banks, which was estimated at the equivalent of $480 million.217 
The humiliating defeat of the Iraqi security forces and the fall of one of the largest 
cities in Iraq to a terrorist group triggered massive political and religious reactions. Usama 
al-Noujeifi, head of the Iraqi parliament at the time, declared in a press conference that “all 
of the province of Ninawa had fallen in the hands of the terrorists.”218 He blamed the 
security forces for abandoning their positions and said that “members of the Army and 
police took off their uniforms and deserted their posts in Mosul.”219 Similarly, Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, declared a state of emergency in Iraq.220 Meanwhile, the central 
government and the governor of Ninawa were exchanging blames for the catastrophic 
unfolding of events in that region. 
Beyond government reactions, the Shiite religious leaders and clerics sensed an 
imminent threat from ISIS and started motivating the Iraqi people to join the fight. Most 
notably, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, one of the most revered Shia marjaa and who 
resides in Najaf in Iraq, joined these efforts. On June 13, 2014, during the Friday prayer’s 
sermon, al-Sistani’s representative Abdel Hadi al-Karbalai declared that al-Sistani has 
issued a fatwa for “al-jihad al-kafaii” (The sufficient Jihad).221 This religious ruling called 
upon all able Iraqi men to carry arms and join the fight against ISIS.222 The content of this 
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fatwa phrased the call as a religious duty and al-Sistani declared that anyone who dies 
during the fight would be considered a martyr. Even though al-Sistani called upon all the 
Iraqi people to fight, coming from a Shiite cleric and its Shiite context only resonated with 
the Shia of Iraq. The number of Sunnis who turned up at the security forces’ volunteering 
centers did not exceed two percent of the total volunteer force.223  
The call for Jihad was done by a Shiite religious leader, and it was natural for Shia 
civilians to identify with that more than Iraqis from other religions. Al-Sistani had phrased 
the attack as targeting all of Iraq, but he also hinted for the need to protect the Shiite holy 
shrines. Also, the promised reward for those who would be killed in the conflict was 
martyrdom. One would have to be a believer of the Shia religion to value such a promise 
and become motivated to give one’s life for that. Additionally, in that call, al-Sistani 
mentioned at one point that the people of Iraq needed to secure Baghdad, Karbala, and 
Najaf. This as well would be referring to parts of Iraq that are predominantly Shia. Another 
reason why Shia responded to the call for Jihad was the news that came out a few days 
before the fatwa about hundreds of Shiite army recruits being massacred by ISIS in Tikrit. 
ISIS claimed on June 12, 2014 that it had executed around 1700 Shiite army recruits, who 
had fled Camp Speicher in Tikrit.224 Human Rights Watch confirmed that at least 770 men 
were killed in that massacre.225 This event confirmed the fear of the Shia population that 
ISIS was on the way to commit a genocide against them. 
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Moreover, despite al-Sistani’s call for the Iraqi citizens to join the security forces, 
the majority of volunteers signed up with the Shiite militias.226 Al-Sistani’s office even 
issued multiple reports to explain in details the content of the Fatwa. According to the 
official website of al-Sistani, the fatwa explicitly indicated that volunteers should sign up 
with the Iraqi security forces, and that only the later should be responsible for training them 
and assigning them their duties.227 Furthermore, the website clarified the term “kafaii,” 
which means sufficient, and that is even though the fatwa realized that it was the duty of 
every Iraqi to join the fight, when a sufficient number of men mustered to counter the threat 
from ISIS, then it was no longer an obligation for the rest of the Iraqis to take part.228 
Nonetheless, Shiite volunteers flocked the Shiite militias who did not turn down the excess 
of men. 
Several decisions by Nouri al-Maliki’s government before and after al-Sistani’s 
fatwa constituted the political basis of the establishment of the PMF. Two days before al-
Sistani’s fatwa, al-Maliki called for the construction of an auxiliary force to mitigate the 
collapse of the armed forces in Ninawa province.229 However, that did not materialize until 
after al-Sistani’s fatwa and the thousands of volunteers it inspired to join the fight. 
According to al-Forat news, which is part of SICI’s media platform, Iraq’s national security 
advisor, Faleh al-Fayad, announced during a press conference on June 15, 2014 that Prime 
Minister al-Maliki had ordered the establishment of the directorate of al-hashd al-
shaabi.230 The directorate would be composed of regional committees in different Iraqi 
provinces and would manage volunteer forces in those provinces. However, the situation 
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on the ground reflected a different reality, soon the existing Shiite militias were in charge 
of the process, and they were accepting and reorganizing the volunteers within their own 
ranks. Therefore, the PMF became the umbrella organization for the Iraqi militias and it 
gave them a semi-legitimate status. 
The governmental financing of the PMF as well as political sponsorship required 
additional legislation. For more than two years, the Iraqi parliament debated a draft for a 
law that would legitimize and organize the PMF. That draft was put off many times and 
was amended on many occasions, but still most non-Shia parliament members objected to 
it. Then, on November 26, 2016, the Iraqi parliament enacted the al-hashd al-shaabi law, 
which officially declared the PMF had become part of the Iraqi armed forces.231 However, 
the non-Shia members of the parliament objected to that law, and only 208 of 328 members 
of the parliament were present during that session.232 According to the Iraqi parliament 
official webpage, this law gave the members of the PMF similar rights and salaries as those 
of members of the state armed forces.233  
The majority of the PMF is made up of Shiite volunteers and militias, but also 
contains a smaller proportion of Sunni volunteers and organizations. The Sunni component 
of the PMF seems to have been inflated at times by PMF leaders to portray the PMF as 
representative of all the constituents of Iraq. For example, in response to the claim of al-
Maliki that the PMF included non-Shia groups, Mohamad al-Khalidi, a former member of 
the Iraqi parliament described the number of Sunnis in the PMF as vague and suggested 
that “most of the names and numbers for Sunnis in al-hashd were unreal.”234 Nonetheless, 
the PMF included a small number of members who were Sunnis, Christians, and 
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Turkman.235 These volunteers turned out for the fight not because of al-Sistani’s fatwa but 
rather to defend their regions from ISIS. 
B. FIGHTING ISIS 
At the beginning of the phase following al-Sistani’s fatwa, the crowds of Iraqi 
volunteers lining up to join the fight in response to the call for jihad were a mix of youth 
and elderly. The state did not have a ready apparatus to accommodate the flux of recruits 
but the Shiite militias were able to absorb the majority of volunteers. With a strong esprit 
de corps and a coherent mission, the PMF soon started accomplishing victories against 
ISIS. The PMF began by supporting the Iraqi Army but soon took the lead in many of the 
confrontations. Its early success was marred, however, by reports of abuses against Sunni 
civilians. Members of some of the Shiite militias were harming Sunni civilians and many 
such instances were recorded by the media and international organizations. 
The first campaign that PMF units engaged ISIS was the liberation of the province 
of Diyala. This campaign was initiated in late July 2014 and witnessed some fierce clashes 
with ISIS.236 It would take the PMF and the Iraqi forces until January 2015 to completely 
clear the province of ISIS forces.237 The last standoff in Diyala cost the PMF and the Army 
58 dead and 248 injured.238 Another significant campaign was breaking the siege off the 
town of Amerli. During this campaign in August 2014, the PMF was in charge of the 
offensive whereas the Iraqi Army played a supporting role.239 This dynamic would 
continue to repeat itself in many of the confrontations with ISIS. 
The PMF rarely conducted offenses without the Iraqi Army, since the latter was 
able to call air support from the United States and coalition forces. Even though the 
coalition was not directly supporting the PMF, the air strikes were often targeting their 
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adversary. For example, on October 24 2014, in the battle of Jirf al-Nasr, 50 kilometers 
south of Baghdad, the coalition conducted air strikes called in by the Iraqi Army who was 
fighting side by side with the PMF.240 Similarly, Maj. Gen. Rupert Jones, who was a lead 
commander of the U.S.-led coalition, publicly acknowledged that PMF units were 
“incidentally” profiting from air support during coalition operations.241 He specifically 
mentioned the battle of Tal Afar, which was launched August 20, 2017 when PMF forces 
were fighting next to Iraqi troops.242 
The Kurdish Peshmerga was quick to fill some of the void left by the Iraqi Army 
in 2014, and was able to initiate offenses against ISIS. The Kurds were able to gain control 
of the city of Kirkuk in June 2014 after the Iraqi Army abandoned its posts in the region 
following the attack by ISIS.243 On the other hand, in the following months, the Peshmerga 
forces were fighting a difficult fight against ISIS in Ninawa province. On August 3, 2014 
they lost Sinjar and Zimmar, two strategic cities in that province, when they retreated after 
a confrontation with ISIS.244 The Iraqi government recognized that the Peshmerga were 
fighting the same enemy and offered some help even though at many times they had their 
differences. On August 4, 2014, Kasem Atta, the military spokesperson for al-Maliki 
announced that the military ordered the Air Force to support the Kurdish Peshmerga against 
ISIS.245  
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Most of the PMF fighting against ISIS took place in non-Shia regions in Iraq, 
Journalists and human rights advocates have documented grave violations committed by 
members of the PMF against civilians in those non-Shia regions. For example, in 2017, 
Amnesty international published a detailed report that illustrated many of the abuses 
committed by PMF members and other actors in Iraq. The report covers the period from 
June 2014 to November 2016 in addition to October 24 to November 11, 2016.246 Amnesty 
International conducted extensive interviews with victims, witnesses, local and security 
officials, and even militia members.247 One of the challenges Amnesty faced was the fear 
of those interviewed to speak of what they had seen or experienced, or even give enough 
details.248 Another challenge was the difficulty of identifying the perpetrators, especially 
since the militia members would at many times be wearing uniforms that were the same or 
similar to those of the Iraqi security forces.249 
Amnesty International clearly stated in its report that some of the actions of the 
PMF members in the fight against ISIS amounted to “war crimes and other violations of 
the international humanitarian law and human rights law.”250 According to this report, 
Sunnis were the predominant victims of the atrocities committed by the PMF. This 
included extrajudicial executions, torture and killing of men and boys, abductions and 
extortion of the families of the abductees.251 One of the places that witnessed the most 
abductions of Sunnis was the al-Razzaza checkpoint, which until December 2015 was the 
only safe passage between Anbar and Karbala.252 This checkpoint was controlled by Kataib 
Hezbollah (KH), and almost 2200 people had been seized there.253 In September 2015, 
Saraya Assalam (SA) fighters stormed into the Ishaqi camp, which had internally displaced 
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people (IDP) from Farhatiya in Salah al-Din governorate, and captured a number of Sunni 
men.254 During the battle of Diyala, on January 26, 2015, members of the PMF killed 56 
Sunnis in the village of Barwana.255 Also on January 13, 2016, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) 
members abducted 100 Sunni men from Miqdadiya, and they remain missing up to the date 
of the report.256 Furthermore, in May 2016 during the battle of Falluja in Anbar, PMF 
fighters executed 12 men and boys from the Jumaila tribe.257  
There is no doubt that war involves violence and that civilians can be unintentional 
victims of that violence, but in PMF operations, violations of civilian rights and properties, 
and sectarian discrimination seemed to be very common. In most of the incidents 
documented by Amnesty International, the victims were Sunnis and it was clear that the 
Iraqi Shiite militias were engaged in sectarian violence and were being indiscriminate 
between ISIS fighters and Sunni civilians. In addition to the abductions and killings 
discussed earlier, PMF members also engaged in the torture of Sunnis, the systematic 
destruction of their homes, and the louting of their properties.258 Despite the continuous 
reports issued by Amnesty International, no members of the PMF have been locally or 
internationally indicted or prosecuted for human rights violations.259 
C. INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT OF THE PMF 
As we have seen, Amnesty International has recorded many atrocities of the PMF 
against the Sunni population. Some of them amount to war crimes and violations of 
international humanitarian law. The reports of this organization have played a role in 
shaping the worldview about the PMF and in judging their actions. Similarly, Iran’s support 
for some factions of the Iraqi militias painted the PMF in a certain way, where states at 
odds with Iran regarded the PMF as an extension of the Islamic Republic. Whereas, states 
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and non-state actors fighting ISIS, a common enemy of the PMF considered collaborating 
with the Iraqi militias. 
Iran’s support of a faction of the PMF is varied. There are ideological and religious 
ties between certain Shiite militias in the PMF and Iran. Also, some of the PMF leadership 
and at least six of its militias have long established relations with the Quds Force (QF). 
This reciprocal relationship and ideological alignment provided the militias access to 
financial and logistical support, and enabled Iran to increase its sway over Iraq and the 
region. Even prior to the war against ISIS, the Iran facilitated the entrance of Iraqi militias 
to Syria, which in turn helped Iran to realize further regional influence. Therefore, by 
setting up its Iraqi clients for the fight against ISIS and other Sunni groups in the region, 
these militias have become part of a mostly Shiite transnational army commanded by the 
Islamic Republic. 
Saudi Arabia considers the PMF faction supported by Iran as a threat to the Sunnis, 
while other factions may present an opportunity to undermine Iran’s dominance of the Shia 
world. Saudi Arabia is competing with Iran over both regional hegemony and the 
leadership of the Islamic World. The kingdom considers itself the protector of the Sunnis 
in the region and therefore the PMF groups persecuting the Iraqi Sunnis are seen as the 
enemy. The feelings between the Iran-backed Shiite militias and Saudi Arabia is reciprocal, 
and different Iraqi militias have threatened Saudi Arabia on different occasions. For 
example, in October 2015, the leader of the Iraqi militia Sayyid al-Shuhada, which is very 
close to the QF threatened to strike against Saudi Arabia.260 Similarly, in February 2016, 
KH warned Saudi Arabia that if the latter sent troops to Syria then the “doors of hell would 
be opened” for the kingdom.261 Also, in June 2017, Rudaw media network, which is an 
Iraqi Kurdish media organization, showed a video clip of the leader of the PMF, Abu Mahdi 
al-Muhandis, where he praised the accomplishments of the PMF at the Iraqi-Syrian border, 
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and then boasted that the PMF was going to chase ISIS all the way to the Saudi capital.262 
Conversely, recent observations suggest that Saudi Arabia enjoys a different relationship 
with other factions of the PMF. Muqtada al-Sadr’s visit to Jeddah on July 30 2017 and his 
meeting with Saudi crown prince Mohamad Bin Salman falls within that context.263 
For Israel, allies of the Assad regime and Iranian proxies, including some of the 
PMF groups involved in the Syrian war are automatically considered enemies. 
Furthermore, Israel sees these groups as carrying out Iran’s plans in the region, which 
include establishing and maintaining a route from Iran to Lebanon. The Iran backed PMF 
intentions towards Israel have also been manifested at least in a couple of occasions. In 
March 2017, al-Nujaba militia announced the establishment of the Golan Brigade for the 
purpose of freeing the Golan heights from the Israeli occupation.264 Also, on December 9, 
2017 a video was shared over social media showed Qais al-Khazaali, the leader of AAH in 
military uniform at the southern border of Lebanon.265 The message he portrayed was loud 
and clear: AAH wants to be part of the fight against Israel in the next confrontation.266 
Russia has worked directly and indirectly with members of Iraqi Shiite militias, 
especially in the Syrian arena where they have fought alongside the Assad regime. As early 
as March 2015, media reports talked about PMF groups reaching out to the Russian for 
supplies of ammunition and explosives.267 Also, in September 2015, after the Russians 
announced the establishment of a quadruple alliance between Russia, Iran, Syria and Iraq 
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to fight ISIS, Russian military experts arrived in Baghdad and met with Iraqi militia leaders 
that are part of the PMF.268 Furthermore, in the second half of 2016, the head of PMF, 
Faleh al-Fayad, visited Mosco on several occasions and met with Nikolai Patrushev, the 
director of the Russian Federal Security Service at the time to discuss supplying the PMF 
with weapons.269 The Russian military intervention in Syria and the air support they 
provided for the Syrian Army also extended to the PMF fighters defending the Syrian 
regime. In November 2017, PMF combatants approaching the town of Albu Kamal, a 
Syrian town bordering Iraq, enjoyed Russian air support during their offensive.270 
The U.S. has a different stance for the different factions in the PMF. According to 
the U.S., the presence of PMF militias in Syria is problematic, and so is the fact that these 
militias are financed, trained and commanded by Iran’s Quds Force. Similarly, the 
influence of the Iran-backed faction of the PMF on the Iraqi government and its official 
institutions poses a threat to the U.S. efforts to help stabilize Iraq. Moreover, the role that 
these militias have taken in the fight against ISIS, and their rejection to disband or be 
integrated in the armed forces remains the biggest challenge for U.S. foreign policy in Iraq. 
The U.S. State Department has designated some of the Iran-backed militias as terrorist 
organizations such as KH. Also, on November 3, 2017, a bill was introduced into the U.S. 
House of Representatives entitled “Iranian Proxies Terrorist Sanctions Act of 2017,” which 
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imposed sanctions on AAH and Harakat al-Nujaba.271 Conversely, the PMF faction 
following al-Sistani has been regarded as more acceptable. These militias work better with 
the security forces and have shown willingness to be integrated into the Iraqi military. 
Michael Knights, a fellow of the Washington Institute and an expert in the military and 
security affairs of Iraq, highlighted the pros of the Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliya (FAQ) model 
and elaborated the need for the U.S. to support such a model in order to counter Iranian 
influence in Iraq.272 
D. THE ROLE OF PMF AFTER DEFEATING ISIS 
On December 9, 2017, the Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced that 
Iraq has defeated ISIS, has regained control of all its territories, and has secured the borders 
with Syria.273 This marked the end of a long struggle against the terrorist organization, 
which lasted for more than three years. The immediate question on everyone’s mind was 
what was next for the PMF. So far, the PMF has established itself as a capable military 
power that played a significant role in turning the tide against ISIS. It has also gained 
political legitimacy through al-hashd law and has been accepted as a governmental 
organization. However, many aspects remain of concern to some Iraqis, the political class, 
and many international and regional actors. Mainly, the sectarian atrocities on the hands of 
some groups of the PMF, the participation of PMF members in the Syrian conflict, and the 
influence of Iran over one faction of the organization have stained the umbrella 
organization. These presented challenges and maybe obstacles in the way of possible future 
roles of the PMF in Iraq. The Iraqi government has to carefully weigh its options on what 
to do with the PMF while aiming at maintaining stability and security in the country. 
Whereas the leaders of the militias within the PMF were going to capitalize on their 
military successes and their current popularity to translate that into possible political gains. 
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The Iraqi government has tried at least two similar yet distinct approaches when it 
came to dealing with the militias of the PMF. According to Paul Staniland, a political 
scientist who focuses on militia networks, there are four different approaches a government 
or a state can adopt when dealing with militias: collusion, incorporation, suppression, and 
containment.274 The first strategy that the Iraqi government assumed was collusion with 
the Shiite militias as they confronted a common enemy, ISIS. However, soon afterwards, 
the government shifted to incorporation, albeit only being partially successful. Staniland 
indicates that incorporation requires the demobilization of the militias and the integration 
of their members into the state’s security forces.275 Even though the Iraqi government had 
declared that the militias became part of its armed forces under the PMF, it maintained the 
structures of these militias and did not demobilize them. This approach would hinder the 
ability of the state to monopolize the use of force, and would threaten to weaken its political 
system.  
The other two options, suppression or containment, are out of the question in the 
foreseeable future. Suppression aims at destroying the military capabilities of the militia 
and either coercing it into giving in or breaking it down completely.276 Whereas 
containment is less violent, and actions from the state are resorted to only when the militia 
exceeds a certain unacceptable threshold.277 Both approaches are not practical in the Iraqi 
situation taking into consideration the relationship between the militias and the population 
on one hand, and the weakened capabilities of the Iraqi government on the other. The best 
strategy for the Iraqi state would be to pursue the incorporation option, but rather than 
keeping the militia structure intact, the government should break down that structure and 
integrate the members at the individual level. 
The different factions of the PMF seem to have dissimilar visions about their future 
roles. While the faction stemming from the Atabat under the direct influence of al-Sistani 
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has shown clear indications that when al-Sistani “says the word,” they will immediately 
disband, other factions had more ambitious expectations. The faction backed by Iran, for 
example, has been highly resistant to both the idea of demobilization and even the idea of 
completely integrating into the armed forces. Militias within that faction continuously 
reiterate that the PMF should remain independent from the Iraqi security forces and that 
they are the real defenders of Iraq. As for the al-Sadr faction, it has not been clear what its 
ultimate goal was and in the past, we have seen how the Mehdi Army was allegedly 
demobilized, only to resurge later as SA. However, al-Sadr has announced lately that he 
supported the integration of the PMF into the security forces.278 
Nonetheless, the militia leaders have tried to capitalize on their victory over ISIS 
and their resulting positive reputation by trying to boost the image of the PMF as being the 
savior of Iraq. Both Moqtada al-Sadr and Hadi al-Ameri were lead political coalitions in 
the 2018 Iraqi elections. If we take a look at al-Ameri’s “al-Fatah” (the conquest) coalition, 
many of its candidates were leaders of militias backed by Iran, who ended their official 
memberships in these militias in order to be able to run for the elections.279 Iraq’s 
constitution forbids members of the military and security forces to be candidates in the 
parliamentary elections.280  
Pre-election polls showed a surge in the popularity of both al-Sadr and al-Ameri, 
and different predictions favored one or the other in the 2018 elections. Sure enough, the 
official results of the Iraqi 2018 parliament elections showed that Sairoun (Marching 
Toward Reform) coalition led by al-Sadr won a majority of 54 seats out of 329.281 The al-
Fatah coalition led by al-Ameri came in second with 47 seats.282 Prime Minister al-Abadi’s 
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al-Nasr (The Victory) coalition came in third with 42 seats.283 This was a clear indication 
of the PMF’s growth in power and popularity after the ISIS war. Al-Sadr being the leader 
of SA and al-Ameri the leader of Badr Organization (Badr), the Iraqi Shiite militias have 
seemingly secured their role in the Iraqi political arena and their place in the future of Iraq. 
E. CONCLUSION: 
This chapter described the circumstances in which the PMF formed and how fatwa 
of al-Sistani gave the Shiite militias religious legitimacy, the decisions of the Iraqi 
government gave them political legitimacy, and the victories against ISIS afforded them 
with popular legitimacy. On the other hand, we also discussed the atrocities and destruction 
of properties that members of these militias committed against non-Shia civilians, and how 
that negatively affected the reputation of the PMF, alienated other Iraqi constituents from 
identifying with this organization, and contributed to the shaping of the worldview towards 
the PMF and the Iraqi Shiite militias. We found out that many state actors held different 
opinions about the different factions within the PMF. Moreover, we discussed the role of 
the PMF after defeating ISIS, the strategies that the Iraqi government have adopted to deal 
with the PMF so far, and what possible option would work best. We also looked into the 
vision the different factions of the PMF held about the future of the organization. Finally, 
we talked about the 2018 parliamentary election results and their implications. 
  
                                                 




The preceding chapters have examined the roots of some key Iraqi Shiite militias 
and how they developed over time. The focus was mainly on the most influential militias 
and those that have played a significant role in Iraq and the region. From the oldest militia, 
the Badr Organization (Badr), which has existed since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, to 
more recently formed militias such as Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliya (FAQ), these militias 
have come to occupy a central part of politics and the military sector in Iraq. One faction 
of these militias has been backed by Iran. The Islamic Republic has provided training, 
financing and support on various levels. This has helped Iran establish a substantial amount 
of influence in Iraq and they assumed the role of a patron over the militias that they backed.  
The rest of the Shiite militias fell under two other different factions. One is 
composed of a single militia, albeit the largest in the number of fighters, and that is the 
Mehdi Army, which later became known as Saraya Assalam (SA). SA is led by Muqtada 
al-Sadr, and have recently had less coherent ties with Iran, and at sometimes came at odds 
with the Quds Force (QF) leadership. The other faction is directly related to Grand 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. This faction has several militias under its banner, and the most 
known of these militias is FAQ. Though the official mission of these forces was to protect 
the holy shrines, their operation focus has expanded to other aspects across Iraq. Al-Sistani 
is one of the most prominent Shia marjaa in the world, which has garnered him a substantial 
following of devotees. Also he opposes the direct interference of religious leaders in 
politics, and that is why he does not favor Iran’s wilayat al-faqih system. 
Another aspect examined in the previous chapters was the perception of the various 
communities in Iraq toward the Shiite militias. While much of the Shiite population 
supported these militias, young Shiite men joined them, other non-Shia communities, 
especially Iraq’s Sunnis, felt differently. Sunni civilians caught up in the fighting between 
ISIS and the PMF often suffered from extrajudicial violence and retribution carried out by 
certain Shiite militias Such violence was documented by international organizations and 
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the media, both of which also found evidence of the forceful removal of Sunnis from certain 
areas. Moreover, the Kurds have also endured Shiite militias’ violations against civilians, 
especially in Baghdad and other areas populated by Kurds. The Shiite militias have also 
directly clashed with the Kurdish Peshmerga at times. There is a perception that Sunni, 
Kurdish and other minority communities in Iraq remain fearful of the Shiite militias and 
are apprehensive of their increasing power. 
Next, we took a brief look at the history of Lebanese Hezbollah and compared the 
circumstances in Lebanon with those in Iraq. Looking into the Hezbollah case was relevant 
in terms of understanding the different approaches Iran has taken in developing ties to 
militant groups in the region. Even though there existed some similarities between the 
Shiite militias in Iraq and Lebanon, the outcome has so far been different for the two 
countries. In both countries, perhaps in return for Iran’s material support, militias allied 
with Iran adopted the wilayat al-faqih concept as their official doctrine, and their leaders 
pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader. However, while Hezbollah had to partner with 
other constituents of the Lebanese community for political survival since the Shia are not 
a majority in Lebanon, Iraqi militias have had to compromise less with non-Shia groups. 
Because the Shia are the largest confessional community in Iraq, Shiite groups have been 
able to dominate politics without much regard to other non-Shia constituencies. Moreover, 
Hezbollah is the dominant Shiite player in Lebanon and has an alliance with the other major 
Shiite group Amal, whereas the Iran-backed Shiite faction in Iraq is in constant competition 
with the other Shiite factions. 
We then delved into the events of the Syrian civil war, and inspected the role of the 
major external actors interfering in the turn of those events. Countries supporting the rebels 
did not coordinate their support well, and sometimes had conflicting interests. This helped 
lead to a fracturing of the rebel movement and caused a multiplicity of armed rebel groups 
backed by foreign patrons. By contrast, the entities supporting the regime seemed to create 
a much more unified front.  
Iran’s military support to the al-Assad regime started as a covert operation, but 
gradually became exposed as Iran’s involvement grew in scope. Iran committed IRGC 
units to Syria and brought Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite militias into the Syrian 
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arena as well. Iran framed the conflict as an existential war against Sunni extremism and 
emphasized the need to protect Syria’s Shia holy sites from destruction. Iran’s supreme 
leader constantly gave the Shiite participants a religious justification for their part in the 
conflict. However, not all Iraqi religious and political leaders were in favor of Iraqis joining 
the fight in Syria. The most notable objectors were Moqtada al-Sadr and Grand Ayatollah 
al-Sistani. Similarly, other non-Shia leaders expressed their concern that Shiite Iraqis were 
fighting in Syria. 
The Iraqi militias were deployed throughout Syria. They supported the Syrian 
military and worked under the supervision of the IRGC’s QF. The Iraqi militias in Syria 
also learned how to coordinate their land operations with air support, provided by Russia 
and by the Syrian Air Force to a lesser extent. They worked closely with Lebanese 
Hezbollah, the Afghan Fatemiyoun, and the Pakistani Zeynabiyoun, where they acquired 
additional warfare experience. New Iraqi militias were formed for the purpose of fueling 
the Iran backed effort to support the regime and to increase Iranian influence in that part of 
the region. Soon, the Iraqi Shiite militias participating in the war in Syria emerged as part 
of a transnational Shiite force commanded by Iran. 
After that, the discussion turned to the circumstances behind the formation of the 
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The trigger was the capture of the city of Mosul by 
ISIS, which also took control of large territories in Iraq. This event was quickly followed 
by a religious fatwa from al-Sistani that called on jihad, which mobilized a large portion 
of the Shiite population. Also, it was followed by political actions by al-Maliki’s 
government, which set up the basic frame for absorbing the Iraqi volunteers and the birth 
of the PMF. However, existing and newly formed Iraqi Shiite militias took over the 
process, as thousands of Shiite men joined them instead of going to the Iraqi security forces, 
whose image had been scorned after ISIS defeated them in Mosul. Eventually, the PMF 
turned into an umbrella organization that housed mostly Shiite militias. These militias 
preserved their own structure and belonged to three competing factions: Al-Sadr faction, 
al-Sistani faction, and al-Ameri faction. 
The PMF began by supporting the Iraqi military in its battles against ISIS but soon 
took the lead in most of the fights. The Shiite militias were able to accomplish many 
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victories against ISIS and to liberate Iraqi territory, but they also clashed with other Iraqi 
constituents and committed human rights and human law violations. Clashes broke 
between the PMF and the Kurdish Peshmerga, especially after the Kurdish independence 
referendum and over disputed regions with the central government. Additionally, PMF 
members’ violations against Sunni civilians and destruction of property were recorded by 
journalists and international organizations in many of the Sunni regions. The fight against 
ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and the atrocities committed by members of Shiite militias 
influenced the way the world viewed the PMF. While Russia, Iran, the Syrian regime and 
Lebanese Hezbollah viewed the PMF as part of their team, other regional actors like 
Turkey, Israel, the United States and Saudi Arabia had completely different positions with 
respect to the PMF in general and Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite militias specifically. 
After the Iraqi government announced that ISIS has been defeated, that Iraq has 
regained all its territory, and was controlling the country’s borders, the PMF suddenly 
became a pressing reality that the government had to smoothly figure out. The 
government’s approach from 2014 shifted as it tried to deal with the PMF. Facing a 
common enemy, the Iraqi government at first colluded with the Shiite militias, especially 
since the military had just suffered a humiliating defeat against ISIS. Then the government 
switched to incorporation while preserving the internal structure of these militias. This was 
when we witnessed the creation of the PMF, its designation as an official military 
organization, and the issuance of al-hashd al-shaabi law. All these steps portrayed the PMF 
and the Shiite militias underneath it as part of the military institutions in Iraq and provided 
the PMF with an extra layer of legitimacy. However, their persisting independence from 
the Iraqi military undermined the latter, and to some extent this model has shaken the ability 
of the Iraqi government to monopolize the use of force. The increasing power of the Shiite 
militias was translated in the 2018 elections when al-Sadr coalition won the majority of 
seats and al-Ameri won the next biggest number of seats at the parliament. 
The introduction advanced three hypotheses that broke down the role of armed 
groups with a foreign patron in state building in terms of popular, domestic political, and 
international legitimacy. Taking the case of the Iraqi Shiite militias, we will revisit these 
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hypotheses to see how those propositions fit with the evidences provided in the preceding 
chapters. 
B. FIRST HYPOTHESIS FINDINGS 
The first hypothesis contended the presence of a foreign patron might undermine 
an armed group’s legitimacy and domestic standing, especially if the group was seen as 
prioritizing the interests of its patron over those of its own country. In the case of the Iran-
backed Shiite militias in Iraq, we need to look at the popularity of the armed groups from 
the perspective of different Iraqi communities, as there are sharp differences in opinion. 
While the Shiite armed groups were accepted within the Shiite community, the Kurdish 
and Sunni communities feared them more than anything. From the Shiite community’s 
point of view, the presence of ISIS and the framing of the conflict as an existential one 
between Shiism and Sunni extremism, brought the confessional interests of Iraq and Iran 
close together. A large portion of the Shia in Iraq regarded Iran, the foreign patron, as their 
main ally against ISIS. Therefore, militias that had ties with Iran, such as Badr, Kataib 
Hezbollah (KH), and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), have enjoyed an increased level of popular 
legitimacy within the Shiite population since the war with ISIS began. 
Conversely, the Sunnis of Iraq perceived the activities of the Iran-backed Shiite 
militias as aimed against all Sunnis and not just at the extremists. This perception was 
reinforced as the Shiite militias swept through Sunni areas of Iraq in their operations 
against ISIS, where they were accused of indiscriminate violence against Sunni civilians. 
Moreover, the Sunnis were convinced that under direction from Iran, these militias were 
engaged in deliberate efforts to depopulate certain areas of Sunnis. For the Sunni 
community in Iraq, the Shiite militias were often seen a threat and not as a protector.  
Similarly, the Kurdish population did not see their interests fully aligned with those 
of the Shiite militias’ patron, and the folding of events affirmed the Kurds’ fears. Even 
though, the Kurdish forces and the Shiite militias were both fighting ISIS for some time 
and even in some rare moments there might have been cooperation between both sides, 
Kurdish residents of Baghdad were intimidated and harassed by members of these militias. 
Furthermore, when the Kurds conducted the independence referendum and had control 
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over Kirkuk, neither Iran nor Iraq approved of the referendum results. The Shiite militias 
then moved in and took back Kirkuk, and the Kurdish Peshmerga retreated to the territories 
they controlled prior to June 2014. For the Kurds, the Shiite militias were an obstacle to 
realizing their independence, and at some point, their leaders were describing them as more 
dangerous than ISIS. 
Therefore, the presence of a foreign patron actually harmed the popular legitimacy 
of the Iraqi Shiite militias. Both Kurdish and Sunni communities regarded the goals 
pursued by the Shiite militias and encouraged by Iran as serving the interests of Iran and 
threatening the existence of the Kurdish and Sunni populations. They also perceived that 
Iran was shifting the power distribution in Iraq to favor the Shiite population and 
attempting to alter the composition of the Iraqi society rather than allow for the building of 
a unified Iraq. Moreover, by strengthening the Iraqi Shiite militias over the Iraqi Army, 
Iran has compromised the representation of the diverse population in a single strong 
military institution, which further diminished the popular legitimacy of the Shiite militias. 
C. SECOND HYPOTHESIS FINDINGS 
My second hypothesis proposes that recognition from domestic politicians plays an 
important role in attributing domestic political legitimacy to the militias. The Iran-backed 
Shiite militias in Iraq were housed with other Shiite militias under an umbrella 
organization, the PMF. Al-Maliki’s government established the PMF and recognized it as 
a governmental organization. The PMF was also considered as an auxiliary military force 
to the Iraqi Army, and the members of its respective Shiite militias were given similar 
rights to those of the Iraqi Armed forces. This allowed the Shiite militias the lawful use of 
force in Iraq. Moreover, the issuance of al-hashd al-shaabi law by the Iraqi parliament, 
acknowledged the status of the PMF and the militias behind it, including the Iran-backed 
faction. 
Nonetheless, when members of the Iran-backed militias were seen fighting in Syria 
alongside Assad regime and under the command of Iran, several Iraqi politicians criticized 
that and called for the prohibition of fighters going to Syria. This objection did not 
materialize into an influential force, even when some politicians tried to draw the image 
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that members of the PMF, an Iraqi governmental organization, were participating in the 
fight. The only response that came out of the government was when Prime Minister al-
Abadi announced that there were no members of the PMF fighting in Syria. 
The latest indication that the Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq have attained a high 
degree of political legitimacy was seen in the 2018 parliamentary election results. Despite 
the fact that the Iraqi constitution prohibits the participation of military personnel in 
governmental elections, and even though the PMF was established by al-hashd law as a 
military institution, the leaders of the Iran-backed militias were able to form a political 
coalition that ran for the parliament. The coalition, al-fatah, was headed by al-Ameri of 
Badr and with the participation of other Iran-backed militia leaders, who officially cut their 
ties with their respective militias. Al-fateh came second in the election results and secured 
47 seats in the Iraqi parliament. This has reinforced the political legitimacy of the Iran-
backed Shiite militias in Iraq. 
D. THIRD HYPOTHESIS FINDINGS 
In my third hypothesis, I assumed that the international recognition and legitimacy 
of an armed group is directly related to the international status of its patron. Iran is at odds 
with many of the international actors, especially over its regional ambitions and its nuclear 
program. In addition, some countries accuse it of sponsoring terrorism, and it is currently 
under U.S. sanctions. The international status of Iran has directly impacted the international 
image of Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq, specifically as their members targeted U.S. 
forces after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and participated in the war in Syria under Iranian 
command. For example, the U.S. state department has designated KH as a terrorist 
organization since June 2009. Also the Iranian IRGC Quds Force, which works closely 
with and supervises this faction of the Iraqi Shiite militia, has been designated as a terrorist 
organization by the U.S. department of treasury since October 2007. 
However, the worldview of the Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite militias has also suffered 
due to other factors. Specifically, the human rights and human law violations committed 
by its members against Sunni and Kurdish civilians. This was very well documented by 
Amnesty International in its report which was discussed in chapter four. Such horrendous 
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activities revealed the intentions of such groups’ disregard for the multi-ethnic composition 
of Iraq. These events confirmed for the international community, that the goals pursued by 
Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite militias were within Iran’s interests more than in favor of a unified 
Iraqi state. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Iraq’s Shiite militias have assumed a greater role in the security and political system 
in Iraq. The participation of these groups in the fight against ISIS and the victories 
accomplished in that fight afforded them with legitimacy within the Shiite population. On 
the contrary, the violations against other non-Shia communities, especially by the Iran-
backed faction, tainted the Shiite militias’ reputation. This presents the first challenge the 
Iraqi government has to address to determine the future role of these militias.  
By including these militias under the PMF and designating the latter as an official 
military organization, the Shiite militias have become a legitimate force. This in itself is 
the second challenge that the Iraqi government faces. Since the presence of an auxiliary 
military force with internal structures independent from the government, external 
affiliation, and a better military reputation than the Iraqi Army, undermines the role of the 
latter as well as shakes the Iraqi government’s monopoly over the use of force.  
The third challenge comes from the Iran-backed faction of the PMF’s activities in 
Syria. The presence of members of Iraqi militias in the Syrian war seems not just be in the 
interest of an external actor, but also seems to be in contradiction to Iraq’s general foreign 
policy agenda, which, since the end of the Baathist state, has shown no interest of 
interfering in the affairs of neighboring states. Thus involvement in a neighbor’s civil war 
may eventually become harmful for Iraq. Even though the war in Syria has not yet been 
concluded, the participation of Iraqis in that conflict is surely to leave some animosity 
between a faction of the Syrian population and Iraqis. 
Finally, the best option for the Iraqi government to pursue with regard to the PMF 
would be the full incorporation of PMF ranks into the regular military. In order to be able 
to get rid of external affiliations and promote the idea of a strong unified Iraq, the militias 
composing the PMF have to give up their current structure and turn full control to the Iraqi 
 75 
government. This would counter the presence of an auxiliary military entity competing 
with the Iraqi Army. Furthermore, the militia members that become incorporated into the 
army would reinforce the military’s capabilities and its reputation, and the Iraqi 
government would gain exclusive control over its command. 
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